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 Dans le cadre d’un projet de mémoire court, l’objectif de ce travail de recherche 
consiste à présenter une étude critique approfondie du principe de responsabilité dans 
l’œuvre de Hans Jonas afin de mieux mesurer sa portée dans l’évolution contemporaine 
des débats philosophiques en éthique environnementale. Dans un premier temps, il 
s’agira de présenter les arguments fondamentaux du principe de responsabilité dans son 
contexte historique (marqué par des références intellectuelles aux travaux de Bloch, 
Heidegger, Kant). Les réflexions jonassiennes face à la technique, face aux limites de 
l’anthropocentrisme moral constitueront des questions importantes de notre travail. La 
seconde partie de notre mémoire s’inscrit davantage dans la littérature contemporaine en 
éthique environnementale. De nombreuses études scientifiques démontrent que les enjeux 
environnementaux transnationaux les plus importants, dont le changement climatique, 
sont les résultats des interventions technologiques humaines. Comment peut-on retracer 
l’héritage philosophique de Jonas dans le contexte de ces débats contemporains en 
éthique environnementale? 1) L’éthique de la responsabilité a donné lieu aux notions et 
au langage du principe de précaution face aux « risques » (Beck). 2) De même, le débat 
sur la « valeur » de la nature a donné lieu à un formidable débat entre les défenseurs de la 
valeur intrinsèque de la nature (Callicott) et les défenseurs d’une approche pragmatique 
de l’anthropocentrisme moral (Norton). 3) En dernier lieu, la préséance de nos 
responsabilités envers autrui a donné lieu à une certaine conception de la justice 
intergénérationnelle à l’aune des enjeux environnementaux. Le but de ce mémoire 
consiste à mieux comprendre l’héritage philosophique de Hans Jonas à l’aide de ces trois 
illustrations des débats contemporains dans le champ de l’éthique environnementale. 
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 In the context of a short dissertation, the aim of this research is to present a 
thorough critical study of the principle of responsibility in Hans Jonas’s work in order to 
better measure its impact on the contemporary evolution of philosophical debates in 
environmental ethics. First, it is necessary to present the fundamental arguments of the 
principle of responsibility in its historical context (marked by intellectual references to 
the work of Martin Heidegger, Immanuel Kant and Ernst Bloch). Important questions in 
our work examine the Jonassian reflections on technology toward the limits of moral 
anthropocentrism. The second part of our dissertation will be focused more on the 
contemporary literature of environmental ethics. Numerous scientific studies show that 
the most important transnational environmental issues, including climate change, are the 
result of human technological interventions. How can we trace Jonas’s philosophical 
heritage in the context of these contemporary debates on environmental ethics? First, the 
ethics of responsibility gave rise to the notions and language of the precautionary 
principle against “risks” (Beck, 2002). Similarly, the concept of the “value of nature” has 
given rise to a formidable debate between defenders of the intrinsic value of nature 
(Callicott, 2010) and defenders of a more pragmatic approach to moral anthropocentrism 
(Norton, 2010). Lastly, the precedence of our responsibilities towards others has given 
rise to a certain conception of intergenerational justice in light of environmental issues. 
The purpose of this thesis is to better understand Jonas’s philosophical heritage using 
these three illustrations of contemporary debates in the field of environmental ethics. 
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 With industrialization and more rapid communication, it became possible for man 
to transport, transform and exploit natural resources in a very short period of time with a 
reduced workforce. Incapable of defending itself, “nature” has since lost its value and 
organization day-by-day, with global warming and deforestation being two sources of 
blame. Man turned to “nature”, not to protect and save it, but rather to make it a resource 
and center of exploitation. This has led us, in the 21st century, towards an unprecedented 
ecological crisis. Ironically, this ecological crisis not only puts nature in danger, but also 
the life and existence of the human species on Earth; due to the fact that the existence of 
life is made possible on Earth because of the order and organization of that same 
“nature”. This allows us to understand that man, consciously or unconsciously, despite 
his lack of interest in the protection of “nature”, must act differently and change his 
conceptions of nature to ensure the existence of life on Earth in the future. It is in this 
spirit that some, concerned by and preoccupied with the degradation and atrocious 
exploitation of nature, seek to converge towards a new ethical view that will defend the 
cause of nature against the dangers and risks linked to this modern civilization to which 
man is oriented today. 
 This new ethical view deals with all of the questions that relate to man in his 
relationship with “nature”. Hans Jonas defined this concept in his work, “An ethics for 
the future.”1 However, conceptual differences of “Ecology” reveal sharp divergences 
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because our actions today, in the form of global technology, threaten not only the near but even the distant 
future. Thus, moral responsibility demands that we take into consideration the welfare of those who, 




among thinkers and philosophers who take on the task of defending the cause of “nature”. 
According to J. Baird Callicott in his book entitled In Defense of the Land Ethics: Essays 
in Environmental Philosophy, the German philosopher and biologist Ernst Haecked was 
the first person to use the term “ecology” in 1866, when he was trying to find a term to 
represent the study of relationships between organisms and their environment. In the 
same book, in 2010, Callicott further defined ecology as the study of the relations of 
organisms with one another and with their natural environment. According to Callicott, 
various conceptions of the term “ecology” divide philosophers of “nature” into three 
categories, namely: ecocentrists, extensionists and all of the other philosophers of nature 
who see ecology as a sort of applied ethics. Ecocentrists consider themselves as fervent 
defenders of the biotic by fighting for the beauty, integrity and stability of the soil, water, 
plants and animals on Earth. The extensionists, on the other hand, defend an ethics 
directed toward the welfare of animals. Consequently, their main goal, far from 
defending “nature” itself, is the protection of animals, hence the origin of the concept 
“animal liberation”. The third and last category of ecologists is indeed all of those who 
have oriented ecology towards a type of applied ethics; they focus on the political, 
economic and technical aspects of the ecological issues of our era. According to the 
description and vision of these three categories of ecologists, we can relate Hans Jonas to 
the third group: those who consider ecology as a type of applied ethics, aiming to defend 
the cause of “nature” against the risks and threats related to science and technology.  
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University Press, 1996. P. 99 
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  Hans Jonas, and Institute for Antiquity Christianity. On Faith, Reason and Responsibility. Claremont, 




 Jonas was born in Germany to a Jewish family in 1903. He studied philosophy 
and theology alongside philosophers such as Husserl and Heidegger. He emigrated to 
Palestine, Canada and the U. S in 1933, 1939 and 1955, respectively, and eventually died 
in New York in February of 1993. He worked as a professor in all three countries. Jonas 
was known in the field of environmental ethics for his book written in German in 1979 
under the title, Das Prinzip Verantwortung, Versch einer Ethik für die technologische 
Zivilisation” and translated into English in 1984 under the title, The Imperative of 
Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age.  In this book, Jonas 
opposes any anthropocentric concept of ethics or morals supported by his predecessors, 
in which man was considered the center of everything. He chooses this latter ethical 
stance to prevent limiting “ethics” to human beings only, and also to extend it to “nature” 
by acknowledging nature’s value and its essential role in the maintenance of human life 
on Earth. In Jonas opinion, we cannot ensure maintenance and existence of the human 
species, or of future generations, if we do not take responsibility for defending and 
protecting “nature”, on which we are all dependent and an integral part. As Jonas stated 
in his book, On Faith, Reason and Responsibility:  
 “We have intimated that one way go further and say that the common destiny of man and 
nature, newly discovered in the common danger, makes us rediscover nature’s own dignity 
and commands us to care for her integrity over and above the utilitarian aspect.”2	  
To use the words of Arno Munster, in his book, Principe responsabilité ou principe 
espérance: 
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 “Nul ne peut plus dire: que l’homme soit, sans dire: que la nature soit. Voilà pourquoi le oui 
à l’être, que la vie prononce spontanément est devenu au niveau humain devoir-être, 
obligation.”3 
 Jonas was urged to take action when he realized the dangers and threats that man 
exposes “nature” to, especially the rise of utopian Marxism in the second half of the 20th 
century headed by the philosopher Bloch. Jonas felt compelled to curb the advancement 
of technology, which he believed is at the heart of all these dangers and threats that 
nature is facing today. As he mentioned in his book, On Faith, Reason and 
Responsibility:  
 “The danger derives from the excessive dimensions of the scientific-technological-industrial 
civilization. What we call the baconian program – namely, to aim knowledge at power over 
nature, and to utilize power over nature for the improvement of the human lot – lacked 
indeed in its capitalist execution from the outset the rationality as well as the justice with 
which it could have been conjoined.”4	  
 To curb the advancement of the technology, Jonas invited all individuals, parents 
and politicians to first be more aware of their actions, which can damage, directly or 
indirectly, “nature”, and, second, to assume their responsibility in order to preserve the 
existence of future generations. It is through this idea that Jonas, in his book “The 
Imperative of Responsibility, in Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age”5, warns 
all humans to “not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity 
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4	  Hans, Jonas, and Institute for Antiquity Christianity. On Faith, Reason and Responsibility. Claremont, 
Calif., Institute for Antiquity and Christianity, 1981. P. 69 
5	  Jonas’s final major work, The imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethic for the Technology Age 
(1979), connects his speculation about nature to the domain of ethics. He thinks that unless we can think of 
nature as being a source of value, and not a mere resource upon which we project our interests, we will be 
unable to believe in the importance of limits to our technological remaking of nature. Such limits are 
especially urgent given our increasing control over behavior, the process of dying, and even the genetic 
makeup of life. Hans Jonas, and Vogel, Lawrence. Mortality and Morality: a Search for Good after 




on earth”6. Jonas, based on the moral theory of Immanuel Kant and the existentialism of 
Martin Heidegger, gave rise to a new ecological imperative, baptised under the name of 
“Responsibility Principle”. 
 In the first part of this research, we will separately address the works of these two 
authors, Heidegger and Kant, in order to bring out the ontological and deontological 
foundation of the Jonassian “Responsibility Principle”. We will then analyze the works of 
Bloch, in particular his “Principle of Hope”, in order to understand and articulate Jonas’s 
position regarding technology as it relates to Marxism. In the final analysis, we will 
scrutinize in greater detail Jonas’s work, in particular his “Responsibility Principle”, with 
the objective of highlighting its importance and impact on the current ecological 
movement.  
 Jonas has worked on Gnosticism, bioethics and the environmental ethics, however 
his work is not well known in the field of environmental ethics in North America. Many 
internal and external factors could explain this unpopularity. First of all, the lack of 
clarity, sufficiency and pertinence of which Jonas's works are the objects of criticism 
plays much to this unpopularity. Indeed, his “Responsibility Principle”, rather than 
defending the cause of “nature”, is only a means used by Jonas to defend the cause of 
humanity and the preservation of human existence. Secondly, the lack of persuasion and 
involvement of his work in the field of environmental ethics are also key components of 
this unpopularity. Thirdly, the lack of importance that they give to philosophy in North 
America comparatively to Europe also plays a role in his unpopularity. As he stated in his 
book entitled Memoirs: 
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 “In America people don’t really believe in philosophy in the sense in which it’s pursued in 
France or Germany. At any rate, I was taken less seriously by the professional philosophers 
in America than in Germany.  Another factor may be that although ecological topics are 
discussed in America, they’re apparently far less prominent than in Europe – and in the 
political arena least at all.”7 
 Some even say that Jonassian ethics is much more an ethics of humanity than an 
environmental ethics. In brief, the question we are trying to answer in this work is: does 
the Jonassian “Responsibility Principle” have an importance and/or impact in the 
contemporary environmental ethics debates? If so, how could we explain its importance 
and/or impact? 
 The second part of this endeavour will be devoted to the analysis of the works of 
three contemporary philosophers in environmental ethics: Ulrich Beck with his “Principle 
of Precaution” versus “risks,” J. Baird Calliquott with his concept of “Intrinsic Value” of 
nature, and Bryan Norton with his approach to the moral anthropocentrism of 
contemporary philosophy. The analysis of the works of these three philosophers will 
allow us to trace and answer our questions about the importance and impact of the ethics 
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I. The genesis of Hans Jonas’s “Responsibility Principle”, and its position in regards 
to technology 
 We start the first part of this research by addressing three philosophers: Martin 
Heidegger, Immanual Kant and Ersnt Bloch, in order to trace the origin of Jonas’s 
“Responsibility Principle” and Jonas’s stance on the progress of technology praised by 
Ersnt Bloch in his “Principle of Hope”. In the first section, we will examine the work of 
Heidegger, in particular his concept of “Being”, in order to show the ontological 
foundation of Jonas’s “Responsibility Principle”. In the second section, we will analyse 
Kant’s “Moral Obligation”, in order to educe the deontological foundation of Jonas’s 
“Responsibility Principle. In the third and last section, we will address Bloch’s 
perspective according to his “Principle of Hope”, to better elucidate the opposition that 
exists in Jonas’s “Responsibility Principle” and the concrete utopia and Marxism of 
Bloch.  
I. 1 Ontological foundation of Hans Jonas’s “Responsibility Principle” 
 In the first section of this research, by addressing the theory of “Being” of M. 
Heidegger, we will trace the ontological foundation of Hans Jonas’s “Principle 
Responsibility.” According to Heidegger, man as a “Being” possesses two correlational 
abilities that allow him to prove his existence among other “Beings”. These two abilities 
are his openness and relationship to others. We will first examine the theory of “Being” 
of M. Heidegger in order to introduce his concept of “Dasein”.  We will then analyze the 
two correlational abilities that allow man to attest to his existence and his singularity as 




I. 1. a) Hans Jonas and the “Dasein” of Martin Heidegger 
   In this sub-section we will first address the “Dasein” in Heidegger’s work that 
will allow us to understand the ontological concept of man in the “Responsibility 
Principle” of Jonas. Of all the philosophers that impacted and influenced Jonas during his 
time, Heidegger remained one of the most important ones for our work, since it was 
through him, and especially through his concept of “Dasein,” that Jonas was able to give 
rise to his concept of man. According to Jonas in his “ Responsibility Principle”, man is a 
being that constantly needs “others” in order to have and prove his existence in the 
world. It is necessary to first explain this concept of Heidegger’s “Dasein” in order to 
trace the metaphysics of Heidegger at the roots of Jonas’s “Responsibility Principle” that 
will prove that man completely depends on “nature” because of his openness and 
relational abilities with “others”.  
 Heidegger, in his quest to grasp the meaning of “Being”, has highlighted the 
intertwining of “being as such” and the finitude of man as “existent” among other 
“existents”. This usage of the Heideggerian “Being” is in fact the “Dasein”, which 
literally means, “being there”. In other words, “human existence”, thought to be as 
“human presence in the world” or “Being in the world”, is the same as using the term 
“Dasein”. It is in this perspective of the concept of man that Jonas, in his book The 
Imperative of Responsibility, in Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age, maintains: 
 “The existence of man in the world had been a first and unquestionable given, from which 
 all idea of obligation in human conduct started out.”8 
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 However, the Heideggerian’s concept of  “Being” is not always written in the 
same way and does not always have the same meaning in Heidegger’s writings; 
sometimes he writes “Dasein” and other times “Da-sein”. This small nuance is actually 
created by the different perspectives Heidegger gives to the concept “Being”. He uses 
“Dasein” in the existentialist perspective of man. As Jonas mentions it in his book, 
Mortality and Morality: 
 “The concept of substance disappears, everything is always ‘in process,’ so to speak, and 
what was formerly called the subject is now called ‘Dasein’. This extremely general and 
abstract infinitive becomes the technical designation for being in its specifically human 
forms, indeed for individual concrete persons as they experience themselves from within.”9   
Starting from the concept of man to arrive at the concept of “Being” means that “Being” 
is considered much more than man. Etymologically, “Dasein” means, “Being there” or 
“being in the world”.  
 According to Jonas, the term “Da-sein” is used in a more metaphysical way, 
where we must start from the concept of “Being” in order to arrive at the concept of man.  
In this sense, man is considered much more than the “Being”. Roger Verneaux sums this 
up by saying: 
“[...] On ne doit pas négliger un artifice d’écriture apparu dans les dernières oeuvres de 
Heidegger: il écrit tantôt “Dasein” tantôt “ Da-sein, afin de marque rune différence de 
perspective. Le premier terme correspond à l’analyse existentiale, où l’on part de l’homme 
pour arrive à l’Être, où l’on considère l’Être par rapport à l’homme.  Le second correspond à 
la métaphysique, où l’on part de l’Être pour arrive à l’homme, où l’on considère l’homme par 
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rapport à l’Être. Le ‘Dasein’ est l’homme en tant qu’ouvert à l’Être et le ‘Da-sein’ est 
l’homme en tant que lieu où apparaît.”10 
According to Jonas, the “Da-sein” is also a compound to distinguish a special form of 
being among other forms of “Being”. As Jonas states it in his work, titled Mortality and 
Morality: a Search for Good after Auschwitz: 
 “The ‘da’ indicates that this special form of being surrounds itself with a horizon toward 
which it lives.”11 
 Jonas did not create the foundation of his “Responsibility Principle” on both 
Heideggerian concepts of “Being”: “Dasein” and “Da-sein”. Instead, he tried to lead his 
work only towards the Heideggerian concept of “Dasein”, by highlighting the threats 
against the existence of man on Earth. However, the political view difference of Jonas 
and Heidegger forced Jonas to break away from Heidegger and his philosophy. Jonas, a 
Jewish philosopher born in Germany, lost his mother in the Holocaust to the Nazis and 
later discovered that his former professor and mentor, Heidegger, defended and supported 
the National Socialist Party (Nazi) during his infamous rectoral address in 1933. For this 
and other reasons, Hans Jonas took his position against Heidegger and his philosophy. As 
Jonas mentions in his book, Memoirs: 
 “After the war, my work in philosophy was marked initially by my renunciation of 
Heidegger’s existentialism in favor of my philosophy of life. One impetus for this step was 
certainly my shock at Heidegger’s behavior during the Nazi period, including his inaugural 
address when he was installed as rector of the University of Freiburg on 27 May 1933, and 
his shabby and disgraceful treatment of Husserl.”12 
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 In the same book, Jonas continues expressing the influence that Heidegger had on 
him and the reason why he chose to break away from his philosophy. Jonas was 
disappointed and betrayed by Heidegger’s behavior and attitude toward the Nazis. And 
considered Heidegger as a shameful and disgraceful example in the field of philosophy: 
  “Given Heidegger’s influence on me, his behavior was a cruel and bitter disappointment, 
not only in him as a person but also in the power of philosophy to arm people against such 
folly. In the originality of his thought, Heidegger remains a powerful figure in intellectual 
history, a path breaker who opened up new territory. That the most profound thinker of our 
time fell in with the goose-stepping brown-shirted battalions struck me as a catastrophic 
failure on the part of philosophy, as a disgraceful moment in world history, as the 
bankrupting of philosophical thought.”13  
In the light of Heidegger’s concept of “Dasein”, we will now examine the 
ontological foundation of Jonas’s perspective on the “Responsibility Principle”. This 
concept of “Dasein”, as the imbrication between the “Being” and man, allows us to see in 
man the ability of openness and the relation that he has with “nature”. It is exactly 
because of the openness and ability to relate to “others” that enables man to either 
safeguard or destroy the other “existents”.  
I. 1. b) Hans Jonas and man’s openness and ability to relate to “others”  
 Heidegger considered man as an opening to “Being,” or the “area of illumination 
of Being”. In turn, man is only able to find the meaning of his existence through his 
openness and his relationship to others. Heidegger also supports that those two related 
abilities are at the core of man, and this is the reason we consider the theory of “Being” 
as the ontological foundation for the “Responsibility Principle” of Jonas. 
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  Jonas sustains a new “concept of ethics”14 within his “Responsibility Principle”, 
where man’s openness and relation with “nature” allows him to take responsibility by 
protecting and safeguarding “nature”. Jonas embraced this new view on ethics in order to 
preserve the survival of future generations. He also supported the Heideggerian 
ontological view; although he did not view man as a “Being” who wants to take 
responsibility for others, he considers man as a “Being” who accepts his own fragility 
and presence as an “existent”. By understanding his fragility and limits as an “existent” 
through the phenomenon that we call “death”, he is able to feel responsible for the safety 
of his own life and the maintenance of life of future generations. This is where Jonas and 
Heidegger’s opinion converge: man’s consciousness is defined by his fragility and his 
ability to do whatever it takes to maintain his existence among “others”. By extension, 
man is also responsible for protecting and safeguarding “nature”, on which his life and 
his existence are dependent. We can better understand this convergence in a quote from 
Jonas in his book entitled Mortality and Morality: 
 “Essential to the idea of humanity is the capacity for responsibility. The duty to ensure the 
future existence of mankind includes the duty to preserve his essence by not undermining 
the conditions in which man can show himself to be ‘the executor of a trust which only he 
can see, but did not create’.”15  
 Moreover, one can explicitly understand the ontological basis of Jonas’s 
“Responsibility Principle” with the motto “safeguard nature in order to maintain the 
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existence of humanity on earth”. Jonas reiterates that the human subject is capable of 
knowing the objective reality of his existence, or at least the openness to “Being”, in a 
double sense. For example, as long as man recognizes himself as existing, he will do 
what he must in order to prevent annihilating himself: 
 “Man is the only being known to us who can assume responsibility. The fact that he can 
assume it means that he is liable to it. This capacity for taking responsibility already 
signifies that man is subject to its imperative.”16  
 Jonas’s ontological foundation relies upon the “Responsibility Principle” in the 
interpretation of the Heideggerian theory of “Being” in particular in the concept of 
“Dasein”. However, according to Pommier, his interpretation of ethics does not rely on 
the openness of the “Being”. His new interpretation of ethics is, rather, centered in the 
individual ability of man to show his responsibility to maintain and preserve the existence 
of the humanity. This creates a “divergence in the work of these two authors”17, even 
though they share some common ground. We will be able to trace this divergence to Hans 
Jonas’s concept of the value of “nature” in the fourth section of the first part of this work. 
Jonas will then be able to affirm the openness and the ability of man to relate to “nature” 
not only as an instrument at our disposal, but also as an end in itself that deserves respect, 
rights and protection. We can better understand Jonas’s interpretation of Heidegger’s 
theory of “Being” with this statement by Vogel Lawrence: 
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“The existential interpretation to include the biological facts allows Jonas to ground an 
ethics in the depths of Being: to find value in nature and so to conceive of our freedom as 
subject to a heteronomous source of authority. The goodness of Being, reality, or nature 
opens up a ‘genuine present’ because it gives us a future worth caring for. This is the 
meaning of Jonas's pointedly anti-Hedeggerian motto: ‘Responsibility is the moral 
complement to the ontological constitution of our temporality’.”18  
 With Heidegger’s theory of “Being”, we have shown the importance of his 
concept of “Dasein” in the Jonassian “Responsibility Principle”. The concept of “Dasein” 
allows Hans Jonas to prove that man ontologically has in him two correlational abilities, 
namely: his openness and his relational abilities with “others”. According to Jonas, by 
following the Heideggerian theory of “Being”, man is able to maintain his existence on 
Earth because of these two correlational abilities he has in his essence that allow him to 
open up to himself and relate to “nature”.  
I. 2 Deontological foundation of Hans Jonas’s “Responsibility Principle”  
 We have discussed the ontological foundation of the Jonassian “Responsibility 
Principle” from Heidegger’s perspective. In this subsection, we will aim to underpin the 
deontological foundation of the Jonassian “Responsibility Principle”, following the 
thoughts of the philosopher Immanuel Kant. Firstly, we will demonstrate that man, in 
addition to be an “existent” ontologically capable of understanding his own existence by 
virtue of his openness and ability to relate to “others”, is also an “existent” that is 
endowed with the ability of “will” and an intrinsic value. Secondly, we will then analyse 
the categorical and hypothetical imperative of Kant in order to bring out the foundation of 
Jonas’s “ecological imperative”. According to Jonas, man, in addition to his abilities of 
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“will” and rationality, also possesses feelings that guide his actions in his efforts to 
maintain the existence of humanity on Earth and, by extension, the preservation of 
“nature”.  
I. 2. a) Hans Jonas and man’s ability of “will” with Immanuel Kant 
 “Will”, as a philosophical term, is generally defined as “a particular sort of 
capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various 
alternatives.”19	   According	   to	  Kant,	   this	   connotation	   remains	   idem:	   an	   ability	   that	   is	  
found	   only	   in	  man	   as	   a	   rational	   being	   and	   allows	   him	   to	   orient	   his	   actions	   in	   the	  
guidance	  of	  laws	  and	  principles	  derived	  from	  his	  rationality.	  However,	  Kant	  explains	  
in	  his	  book	  entitled	  Fundamental	  Principles	  of	  the	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals,	   that	  these	  
laws	  and	  principles	  must	  be	  derived	   from	  the	  rationality	  of	  man,	  apart	   from	  all	  of	  
man’s	  inclinations	  or	  feelings:	  	  
“The will is conceived as a faculty of determining oneself to action in accordance with the 
conception of certain laws. And such a faculty can be found only in rational beings. Now that 
which serves the will as the objective ground of its self-determination is the end, and if this is 
assigned by reason alone, it must hold for all rational beings.”20 
 Jonas, contrary to Kant, did not only see man as a “rational being” acting only in 
the guidance of his rationality. According to Jonas, man, in addition to his rationality, 
also possesses feelings that can orient and motivate him to act by virtue of his interests 
and his inclinations. As Jonas states in his work entitled The Imperative of Responsibility, 
in Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age: 
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“Being good-in-itself, addresses an ‘ought’ whenever it comes under the custody of a will. 
Though such a will must be infused with a feeling of responsibility in order to be moved by 
the object that obligates it, it must experience itself as responding to a transcendent 
summons in order for the moral sentiment ‘to be in its own eyes more than a mere 
impulse’.”21 
 In contrast to animals that act only according to instinct, man acts according to a 
value or to something he determines worthwhile. Moreover, when “will” enters into man 
simultaneously with his capacity of reason, “intelligence”22 allows him to conceptualize 
the existence and veracity of other “Beings”. It is in this idea that we understand that 
“will” is the starting point of all human activities. Some even say that, far from being the 
capacity of intelligence, it is rather the abilities of “will” and rationality that distinguishes 
man from animals. Using Kant’s words to elucidate this idea, Jonas states: 
“‘Reverence for the law’, for the sublimity of the unconditional ‘thou shalt’ that issues from 
reason. In other words, reason itself becomes the source of an affect and its ultimate object – 
not, of course, reason as a cognitive faculty, but reason as a principle of universality, to 
which the will is enjoined to conform.”23  
 Jonas, as is the case with predecessors, sees in man this ability of “will” as the 
primary reason for his evolution among other “existents”. According to him, it is this 
ability of “will” that allows man to change and improve his relation with “nature” by 
taking responsibility for his actions toward “nature”. For Jonas, if man by his faculty of 
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“will” has power over “nature”, it is not in fact a power to exterminate the existence of 
life on earth, but is rather a power to protect himself and ensure the very existence of 
future generations on Earth.  
I. 2. b) Hans Jonas and the concept of value of man with Immanuel Kant 
 By following Kant’s thoughts, we are going to demonstrate the difference existing 
between Jonas and Kant in accordance with their conception of the value of man and 
“nature”. Jonas and Kant both agree that man has not only a faculty of “will” but also an 
intrinsic value that makes man a unique and different “Being” among the other “beings”. 
Kant sees this distinction between man and other “existents” not in a mutual relation with 
“others”, but rather with respect to dominance and exploitation. He also considers all 
other non-rational “existents” as “things” that only have extrinsic value. Quoting Kant: 
“Man and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to 
be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or 
other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end.”24 
 Jonas diverges from Kant, not because of the intrinsic value that Kant confers to 
man, but because of the contrast Kant makes between man and “nature” by affirming that 
man is the only “existent” that has an intrinsic value. While he considers man a rational 
“Being” endowed with intrinsic worth, he considers nature to be a means to serve the 
needs of man. In this sense and according to him, it is quite natural for man to exploit and 
even over-exploit “nature” without taking into account future consequences. As Jonas 
states it in his book, entitled “Philosophical Essays: from Ancient Creed to Technological 
Man”: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Immanuel, Kant. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Thomas Kingsmill 




 “Insofar as it is the fate of man, as affected by the condition of nature, which makes us care 
about the preservation of nature. Such care admittedly still retains the anthropocentric focus 
of all classical ethics.”25  
  For Jonas, it is precisely this extrinsic conception of “nature” that we must 
redefine if we want to preserve the existence of humanity. It is in this spirit that 
Jonas insists on the redefinition of ethics as a non-anthropocentric ethic that 
should see in “nature” not only a means but also an end in itself that deserves 
respect and protection. 
I. 2. c) The categorical and hypothetical imperatives of Immanuel Kant 
 In this subsection, we will approach the models of “Moral Obligation” of 
Immanuel Kant in order to understand and better elucidate the deontological foundation 
of Hans Jonas's “Responsibility Principle”. According to Kant, in addition to his faculty 
of “will” and his intrinsic value, man is also endowed with a sense of duty and obligation. 
In Kant’s view, this sense of duty and obligation can be interpreted in two different ways, 
either as a categorical imperative or a hypothetical imperative. We can interpret the sense 
of duty and obligation of man as a categorical imperative, according to Kant, when this 
sense of obligation is applying to man as an “existent”, without any consideration of 
humans’ interest, but only because of the “rationality” and the “will” that man is 
endowed with. As Jonas mentions in his book entitled Philosophical Essays: from 
Ancient Creed to Technological Man:  
 “With this imperative we are, strictly speaking, not responsible to the future human 
individuals but to the idea of Man, which is such that it demands the presence of its 
embodiment in the world.”26	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On the other hand, according to Kant, we can also interpret this duty and obligation of 
man as a hypothetical imperative, where this sense of obligation applies to man in a 
conditional form, not only because of his rationality and his ability of “will”, but also 
because of the feelings that man is endowed with. We can better understand the 
difference between these two Kantian interpretations of the sense of obligation of man 
when Jonas states: 
 “Kant’s differentiation between hypothetical and categorical imperative applies here, too. 
The hypothetical (of which there are many) says: if there are human beings in the future – 
which depends on our procreation – then such and such duties are to be observed by us 
toward them in advance. But the categorical commands only that there be human beings, 
with the accent equally on the ‘that’ and the ‘what’ of the obligatory existence. For me, I 
admit, this imperative is the only one, which really fits the Kantian sense of the categorical, 
that is, the unconditional.”27	  
 The Kantian hypothetical imperative will play a leading role in Jonas’s 
development of the “Responsibility Principle” and its ecological imperative, which we 
will look at in the next section. With Jonas, in addition of the “rationality” and the ability 
of “will”, the feeling of fear will have a main role in the foundation of his ecological 
imperative. Despite the rational and intrinsic dimension that it attributes to man by 
following the Kantian model, this new Jonassian imperative takes a completely different 
path from Kant’s “Moral Obligation” in several ways. The Jonassian imperative is not 
only based on the rationality and the ability of “will” as it is in the Kantian categorical 
imperative, nor does it view “nature” only as a means for man. Hans Jonas’s imperative, 
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contrary to that of Kant, is based on a heuristic of fear and embraces man not only as an 
end in himself, but also confers to “nature” a value in itself. As Jonas states in his book 
entitled On Faith, Reason and Responsibility: 
 “My main fear rather relates to the apocalypse threatening from the nature of the 
unintended dynamics of technical civilization as such, inherent in its structure, whereto it 
drifts willy-nilly and with exponential acceleration: the apocalypse of the ‘too much’ with 
exhaustion, pollution, desolation of the planet.”28 
 Overall, we have briefly reviewed the works of these two philosophers, namely 
Heidegger and Kant, in order to reveal the ontological and deontological foundations of 
Hans Jonas’s “Responsibility Principle”, which is in fact the central point of this 
endeavour. We have demonstrated ontologically that man is an “existent” who possesses 
an openness and relational ability and who needs “others” in order to affirm and maintain 
his existence in the world. With Hans Jonas, this openness and relational ability will 
protect and safeguard “nature” in order to maintain and preserve the existence of 
humanity, since human life depends on the wellbeing of “nature” in a “sine qua non” 
way. Moreover, we have highlighted the deontological foundation of Jonas’s 
“Responsibility Principle”, by addressing the Kantian interpretation of the sense of duty 
and obligation of man as a rational “Being” that possesses an ability of “will” and an 
intrinsic value. In light of the Kantian hypothetical imperative, Jonas establishes the basis 
of his “ecological imperative”, where he considers man not only as a rational “Being” 
possessing the ability of “will” and an end, but also as a rational “Being” endowed with 
feelings that orient and motivate his actions toward the maintenance of humanity on 
Earth, and by extension the safeguard of “nature”. 
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I. 3 Hans Jonas and the “Principle of Hope” of Ernst Bloch  
 We will now address the “Principle of Hope” of Ernst Bloch in order to 
understand the position of Jonas toward Marxism, which is the culminating and central 
idea of the “Principle of Hope”. Unlike Jonas, who sees technology as a threat to 
humanity, Bloch sees it as redemption, the cornerstone that will enable man to really free 
himself and achieve the authenticity of his being. He argues that technological progress 
will enable man to solve problems brought about by hunger, dearth of labour and social 
inequality characteristic prior to the nineteenth century. 
I. 3. a) Hans Jonas and Ernst Bloch’s concrete utopia and “Marxism” project 
 As already mentioned in the introduction, a myriad of problems facing the world 
prior to the nineteenth century led man into unprecedented modernization, based on the 
abundance of material wealth and the over-exploitation of “nature”. Among the fervent 
defenders of this unprecedented modernization, we also count the philosopher Bloch. 
With his “Principle of Hope”, Bloch praises a concrete utopia and “Marxism”29 in which 
he portrays technology as leading to the advent of the true state of human beings rather 
than a threat to humanity. According to Bloch, the true man is yet to come. In order to 
discover the authentic “Being” in us, we must first seek to entrust ourselves to science 
and technology. Only through science and technology will we be able to experience 
leisure and free ourselves from obstacles that lead to depression, misery and 
discrimination. Jonas offers these clear statements at the end of his book of propaganda 
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entitled, The Imperative of Responsibility, in Search of an Ethics for the Technological 
Age: 
“The first requirement for utopia is material plenty for satisfying the needs of all; the second, 
ease of appropriating the plenty. For the formal essence of utopia, as we shall see, is leisure, 
and leisure can only exist with comfort, with an assured supply of the goods of life and a 
minimum of toil in obtaining them, since leisure is formally just freedom from toil in the 
service of need (or of wish fulfillment in general). A perfected technology can procure both 
these—abundance and its foil-free command— [...]”30  
However, Jonas has never hidden his contempt of opposition to the utopian 
Marxism of Bloch. It is exactly against this chimerical and Marxist conception of human 
existence on Earth by which Jonas gave light to the “Responsibility Principle” not only 
demonstrating his clear opposition to Bloch, but also alerting us to the dangers associated 
with this modernization. According to Jonas, this concrete and Marxist utopia implicitly 
contains the germs for the destruction of “nature” and the consequent annihilation of 
humanity. Even if Bloch’s concrete utopia and Marxism project did not seek to threaten 
the ideas of human evolution or civilization, Munster emphasizes more clearly the 
opposition of these two authors at the beginning of his book entitled Principe 
responsabilité ou principe espérence: 
“ c’est contre l’optimisme militant de Bloch invoquant l’espérance utopique, et contre la 
vision marxiste de l’histoire et du « royaume de la liberté » émancipant l’homme de 
l’aliénation par le travail, que Jonas défend, jusqu’au tout dernier chapitre de son ouvrage 
consacré à la «  critique de l’utopie […]”31 
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 Jonas opposes Bloch’s marxist utopia further. According to him, if religion was 
considered the opium of the people, it is actually technology, promoted and defended by 
Bloch with his marxist utopia that is in fact the opium of the people. In The Imperative of 
Responsibility, in Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age, Jonas stated: “marxist 
utopia, involving the fullest use of super technology, served as an ‘eschatologically’ 
radicalized version of what the worldwide technological impetus of our civilization is 
moving toward anyway. Thus the critique of utopia is implicitly a critique of technology 
in the anticipation of its extreme possibilities.”32 According to him, the only way we can 
protect ourselves against this “false hope and illusion” spread by Bloch is to assume our 
responsibility as inhabitants of this planet. By taking our responsibility, we will be able to 
curb the threats and dangers facing both “nature” and the future of the humanity. We may 
better understand Hans Jonas’s position against the rise and the progress of technology 
with a quotation from Eric Pommier’s book, entitled Ontologie de la vie et éthique de 
responsabilité selon Hans Jonas: 
“La possibilité d’une démondanéisation de la vie et d’une destruction du monde humain, la 
perspective de voir l’homme perdre le sens de ses possibilités les plus propres et de voir la 
vie perdre les siennes propres ainsi que la dynamique qui prépare souterrainement ces 
possibilités, révèle d’une part l’être-fragile de l’humanité et de la vie, d’autre part notre 
devoir de la préserver. La crainte pour la vie et l’humanité, qu’actualise le potentiel 
technologique, porte au premier plan notre devoir de responsabilité envers l’être de la vie et 
de l’homme, en tant que nous sommes tout autant le poison que le remède. ”33  
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In this excerpt, Pommier lends insight into why Jonas was obliged to take action against 
the Concrete utopia and Marxism Bloch’s project. According to Pommier, Jonas believes 
that rapid progress of technology not only puts “nature” in danger but puts his own 
existence in danger, too. Pommier argues that this is logical, considering that life is 
dependent on the stability and the well-being of “nature”. As Jonas stated in his book, 
entitled Memoirs:  
 “Suddenly philosophy’s new assignment became one that had to be undertaken together 
with biologists, physicists, and theoretical economists – for the sake of saving life on earth.  
Well, that was my position, and we can’t afford a utopian notion of individual fulfillment, 
of achieving an ideal society; it’s simply too dangerous. First of all, such a goal is 
overreaching, and second, under current conditions it can lead straight to destruction – by 
raising people’s expectations instead of moderating them. This was my objection to Ernst 
Bloch’s Principle of Hope.”34  
 We have addressed the concrete utopia and Marxism Bloch’s project in order to 
bring out the opposition of Jonas towards technology and the Blochian “Principle of 
Hope”. Bloch, with his concrete utopia and Marxism’s project, advocates for the progress 
of technology since, according to him, it is only with technology that man can finally 
discover his true being and free himself from all of the social and economic constraints 
that prevent him from having leisure in life.  
I. 3. b) Hans Jonas and the creation and use of technology with Ernst Bloch 
 We have previously discussed Bloch’s concrete and Marxist utopia in order to 
show Jonas's opposition to the progress of science and technology. Now, we will try to 
understand why and how, according to Jonas, the progress of technology is really a threat 
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to “nature” and humanity. As we have seen in the previous paragraphs, “technology” 
plays a predominant role in the works of these two antagonistic authors.  Their 
connotations and conceptions of “technology” do not converge. Through the lens of 
Bloch, we see technology and science creating a much more optimistic and flourishing 
world where mankind could reach his highest potential—a zenith, which he hopes to 
reach but previously never knew how to reach. For Bloch, technology and science has 
freed man from the alienation that the work division has subjected him to. When 
consumed by labour, social inequalities and the anxieties of life, man is unable to take 
charge of his future. He is a prisoner of himself and by himself, and to escape he must 
succumb to modernization. By creating tools that can aid or even replace him in certain 
daily tasks, he will be able to free himself from the alienation of labour and all the 
economic and social constraints that come with it. It is in this spirit that Jonas, in his book 
entitled Mortality and Morality: a Search for Good after Auschwitz, questions why we 
should stop the progress of technology and science since they benefit and fulfill a noble 
vision for humanity: 
 “Technology today has altered the very nature of human action by allowing us to affect 
nature, both outside ourselves and within, in ways that are long-range cumulative, 
irreversible, and planetary in scale. But traditional ethics has presumed that the effects of 
our actions are quite limited. With exception of medicine, techne was believed to be 
ethically neutral. Ethical significance belonged to relation between humans, not between us 
and nature.”35  
Jonas opposed the concrete utopia and Marxism Bloch’s project in order to prevent 
the progress of technology from destroying “nature” and compromising life on Earth.  
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Jonas agrees that technology and science promise a brighter future for the so-called 
advent of the true man. However, this advent of the true man entails profound 
consequences for human existence on Earth, since it also jeopardizes “nature”, which 
supports all life in its delicate ecosystem. In the concrete utopia and Marxism Bloch’s 
project, “nature” has no value in itself. It is only an instrument allowing man to attain his 
goals. However, nature’s resources can be endlessly exploited until they are exhausted. 
Disruption of ecological balance and natural laws could annihilate life on Earth. It is 
precisely because of these threats and risks, appearing in an implicit way in the concrete 
utopia and Marxism Bloch’s project, that Jonas unreservedly denounces and criticizes 
this deadly plot against the existence of the human race. This, too, is what Pommier 
attests in his book, Hans Jonas et le principe de responsabilité: 
“Avec le développement de la technique, c’est à la fois la nature et l’homme qui se trouvent 
menacés, et ce, en un double sens. En premier lieu et au plan ontique, la nature doit subir le 
poids de l’exploitation humaine à un degré tel que son équilibre et son existence sont 
dangereusement remis en question. Le pouvoir prométhéen, démesurément agrandi par la 
technique moderne, fait de l’homme, en tant qu’il est l’agent d’une technique qu’il ne 
maitrise pas, le fossoyeur à venir de la nature. Mais c’est aussi l’homme qui est menacé de 
destruction: en détruisant la condition même de sa venue à l’être et de son maintien dans 
l’être, il prend part au suicide de l’humanité. En compromettant les conditions de vie des 
générations à venir, il prépare sa disparition. ”36 
Jonas recognizes the concrete utopia and Marxism Bloch’s project, similar to his 
“Responsibility Principle” which aims to also maintain the existence of human life on 
Earth. Unfortunately, Bloch, contrary to Jonas, did not take into account the importance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Éric, Pommier. Hans Jonas et le principe de responsabilité. Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 




of the safeguard of “nature” in his concrete utopia and Marxism project. Technology, 
despite its size and importance in the works of Bloch, is only a means for man to free 
himself from the servitude and the existing capitalist socio-economic system. And it is 
precisely this technology advocated by Bloch in his “Principle of Hope” that Jonas seeks 
to thwart and underscore. Jonas argues that such a concept leads to consequences so 
much more detrimental to humanity than to not allow man to discover his true “Being”. 
Despite this, Jonas clearly admits at the end of his book, Principle of Responsibility, an 
Ethics for Technological Civilization, that the main purpose of Bloch with his marxist 
utopia was to find solutions to the problem of hunger in the world when he refers to the 
term “reconstruction of the planet” cited by Bloch in his Principle of Hope: 
“The three items around which extrapolations of needs and limits revolve are food, raw 
materials, and energy—and spread over all of the main the issue of environmental pollution. 
Bloch, with his ‘reconstruction of the planet’, was mainly thinking of food production.”37 
Indeed, this fragment taken from his “Responsibility Principle” makes us understand that, 
despite his fierce opposition to the author of the “Principle of Hope”, Jonas is not entirely 
indifferent to the concern or intention of E. Bloch to find solutions for hunger, poverty 
and social injustice that continue to plague the world. 
 We have addressed Bloch’s “Principle of Hope” in order to understand why and 
how, according to Jonas, the progress of technology is really a threat to “nature” and 
humanity. We have shown the important role of the progress of technology in the 
“Principle of Hope”. According Bloch, the genuine man has not yet come. However, only 
with the progress of technology can man be able to free himself from all of the alienation 
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that prevents him from enjoying life and knowing his authentic self. With the progress of 
technology, man is able to exploit and use “nature” in way that could cause the 
destruction of life on Earth. Jonas, with his purpose of preserving the existence of 
humanity on Earth, opposes the progress of technology, and therefore opposes the 
concrete utopia and Marxism of Bloch’s project.  
I. 4 The “Responsibility Principle” of Hans Jonas 
 This new section will be devoted to a much deeper analysis of Hans Jonas's 
“Responsibility Principle”. In the first two sections we briefly covered the historicity of 
the ontological and ethical foundation of the Jonassian “Responsibility Principle”. In the 
third and previous section, we discussed and clarified the position of Jonas regarding his 
“Responsibility Principle”, as well as the approach advocated by Bloch for his concrete 
and Marxist utopia in his “Principle of Hope”. Now we will further dissect the Jonassian 
“Responsibility Principle” in the second part of this research. To do so, we will first 
address the new ecological imperative of the Jonassian “Responsibility Principle”. Then, 
we will approach Jonas’s view of “nature”: its value and vulnerability. Finally, we will 
examine the two models of Jonassian responsibilities, those of parents and politicians. 
I. 4. a) The ecological imperative of Hans Jonas 
 With this new subsection in our work, we will address the new Jonassian 
ecological imperative. Remember that in the second section of this endeavour, we 
approached Kant’s categorical imperative, which, according to him, would enable man to 
act not only on the basis of his reason but also according to universal norms and 
principles. This examination enabled us to understand that the categorical imperative has 




longer the rationality of man or even universal norms that will be at the foundation of his 
new ecological imperative, but rather the feelings of man: feelings towards and for man’s 
and nature’s vulnerability and fragility. As Jonas mentions in his book entitled On Faith, 
Reason and Responsibility: 
“I contend that we need today an imaginative- anticipatory heuristic of fear to lead us to the 
discovery of the duties, even the ethical principles, with which to meet the challenge of 
coming events.”38  
 Among all of those feelings, fear plays a predominant role in the ecological 
imperative of Hans Jonas, since fear can urge man to protect what they love most and 
what they are most susceptible to lose. We refer here to “our lives,” because there is 
nothing more precious or that we love more than our own lives. Everything man has been 
doing since his first breath has been to keep him alive. According to Jonas, the fear of 
causing the extinction of life on this planet will urge us to take responsibility. In the case 
of technology, Jonas calls for man to take responsibility against the progress of 
technology, which causes the degradation of “nature”, in order to avoid a worse scenario 
for future generations. According to Jonas, it is not because of the atomic bomb that the 
progress of technology is a danger and a threat for “nature” and future generations, but 
precisely because of all the unpredictable decisions and actions that man is taking with 
respect to “nature”. In his book entitled The Imperative of Responsibility, in Search of an 
Ethics for the Technological Age, Jonas clearly states the importance of “fear” in the 
human decision against the possible extermination of life on Earth:   
“For many the apocalyptic potential of our technology is concentrated in the atom bomb. I 
am sure they do not exaggerate the peril. But it has one consolation: it lies in the realm of 
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arbitrary choice. Certain acts of certain actors can bring about the catastrophe—But they can 
also remain undone. Nuclear weapons can even be abolished without this requiring all of 
modern existence to change. (The prospect is admittedly small.) Anyway, decisions still play 
a role—and in these: fear.”39 
 Following this new ecological imperative, man contains within him a sense of 
responsibility that prompts him to preserve life on Earth, a concept already discussed in 
the second section of this endeavour as the concept of a human Being’s “will,” based on 
the deontology of Kant. Indeed, the new ecological imperative of Jonas is a reformulation 
of the Kantian hypothetical imperative. With this new ecological imperative, Jonas 
proposes an imperative that allows man to act not only in terms of his well-being but also 
in terms of the well-being of “nature”. According to Jonas, man must protect “nature” in 
order to preserve the human species.  
 Since “nature” serves as a habitat for all living beings, it should be all the more 
safeguarded so that man can ensure the procreation of his species and the resources he 
needs to survive. Such effort to preserve the human species does not always seem clear 
with Jonas, since it is the authenticity of humanity that he values the most. In his own 
words, Jonas states: “An imperative responding to the new type of human action and 
addressed to the new type of agency that operates it might run thus: Act so that the effects 
of your actions are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life […]”40. 
Unfortunately, Jonas does not clarify what he means when he argues that it is the 
authenticity of humanity that should be preserved. In his book, entitled The Imperative of 
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Responsibility, in Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age, he tries to define the 
existence of humanity in a way that remains vague, unclear, and inadequate: 
“‘Existence of a mankind’ means simply that there live men on earth; that they live well is 
the second commandment.”41   
He simply mentions that the preservation of humanity means that man must live well. But 
how is man to “live well”? What does it mean to live well? This makes us reflect on the 
concrete and Marxist utopia of Bloch, discussed in the third section of our work. 
Although Jonas, with his ecological imperative that stipulates the existence of “genuine 
human life”, differs from Bloch, with his Concrete utopia that proposes the introduction 
of the true man, both of them have in fact the same purpose:  maintaining the existence of 
humanity in the future. Is it not the same “living well” that Bloch mentions in the context 
of his Concrete utopia when he advocates for the advent of “the authentic man”. As 
highlighted in Jonas’s critique of Bloch’s “concrete utopia ”: 
 “All theories of an ‘authentic’ and ‘true’ man whom we are to await or create or make 
possible or even force into existence are only lead us to disaster. All such utopian dreams 
must be countered by the fact that ‘man’ has always been present with everything in him 
that should be avoided and all that cannot be surpassed.”42 
 Despite some lack of clarification of his “ecological imperative”, Jonas still 
remains one of the few thinkers and philosophers of his time who showed concern for 
“nature” in ethical debates. He introduced a new concept in ethics which seeks to take 
care of not only of the relationship between man and “other Beings” similar to him, but 
also between man and “nature”. With this ecological imperative, Jonas made himself a 
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pioneer in the struggle for the conservation of “nature” by seeing “nature”, not as a means 
to the service and the disposition of man, but rather an end in itself demanding respect 
and protection. This is what Arno Munster expresses quite clearly at the beginning of his 
book, entitled Principe responsabilité ou principe espérence: 
“Elle évolue vers une anthropologie philosophie et vers l’esquisse d’une éthique nouvelle 
adaptée aux défis de la civilisation technologique, à savoir une éthique de la responsabilité, 
une éthique du futur, une éthique prévisionnelle des catastrophes écologiques à venir et une 
éthique pour la nature. Plaçant la question de la survie de l’humanité face au danger de la 
destruction de la planète au cœur de ses réflexions philosophiques. ”43 
This excerpt implies a discontinuity in the conception or man’s relationship to “others”, 
where the relationship between man and the “other” was always considered a relationship 
between man and man.  But for Hans Jonas, “other Beings” also meant “nature” in its 
global context.  
 With this new ecological imperative, Jonas incorporates “nature” as a new 
relationship with man. “Nature” will no longer be considered opposite to man, but rather 
among the “others” of man. According to Jonas, we can’t preserve the existence of 
humanity if we don’t first change our view of ethics towards nature.  
I. 4. b) Hans Jonas and “nature” with its value and vulnerability 
 In the previous paragraph, we established differences between the Kantian 
categorical and hypothesis imperative and the ecological imperative. We also showed the 
importance and limitations of the latter. With the “ecological imperative”, Jonas sought to 
preserve the authenticity of humanity, which was one of the complexities that lacked 
clarity in Jonas’s “Responsibility Principle”. He proposed to us this new concept of ethics 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




in which we consider the relationship between man and “nature”. This gives nature a new 
concept and importance for man. One fact is quite clear—if, for Bloch, “nature” was only 
a means placed at the disposal and in the service of man, for Jonas, it was quite the 
opposite. “Nature” finally seems to have a voice in Jonas’s ethical arguments, since, 
according to his arguments in his book titled The Imperative of Responsibility, in Search 
of an Ethics for the Technological Age, we can infer that “nature” is not only considered 
as a means to allow man to achieve his goals, but it also needs to be protected and 
respected in order to maintain the existence of man on Earth Since “nature” has value in 
itself, it will no longer be exploited and used, as advocated in the concrete and marxist 
utopia of Bloch. To repeat the words of Munster at the beginning of his book, Principe 
responsabilité ou principe espérence: 
“ L’homme, destructeur potentiel du travail téléologique de la nature, doit prendre en charge 
au niveau de son vouloir le oui que la nature adresse à l’être et le non qu’elle oppose au non-
être. Nul ne peut plus dire : que l’homme soit, sans dire : que la nature soit. Voilà pourquoi le 
oui à l’être, que la vie prononce spontanément est devenu au niveau humain devoir-être, 
obligation. A ce propos Jonas se focalise sur deux formes majeures d’obligation, à savoir 
l’obligation des parents à l’égard de leurs enfants et l’obligation des hommes politiques.”44  
Munster makes us understand, as we have mentioned in the previous paragraphs of this 
endeavour, that we cannot preserve the existence of our species if we continue to exploit 
and damage nature.  
“Nature” is our only “habitat”, until proof of the contrary, on which we are all 
dependent. We must do something to curb the threats and dangers to which “nature” is 
exposed. “Nature” has never been so vulnerable and disorganized as it is today, because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




of the excessive use on our part of technology and science. Not only have we overused 
and exploited nature due to our extensive use of technology and science, but we have also 
destabilized all the conditions that protect and ensure the existence of life on earth.  These 
contemporary problems include: global warming; acid rain; water and food 
contamination; air pollution; and deforestation, among others. Greisch, in his own words, 
points out in the beginning of his French translation of Jonas’s book, The Imperative of 
Responsibility, in Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age: 
“Encore fallait-il se rendre compte que cette nature elle-même, sous l’influence de la 
technique, n’est plus ce qu’elle était : elle est de moins en moins la grande puissance 
mythique sur laquelle l’homme n’a aucune prise et qui le renvoie inexorablement aux limites 
de son pouvoir. A partir du moment où le pouvoir technologique rend la nature elle-même 
manipulable et de plus en plus altérable à volonté, elle devient elle même un être fragile et 
menacé, presque sans défense, à l’instar de n’importe quel être humain et donc un objet de 
responsabilité.”45  
Jonas goes even further by denouncing the threat of the progress of technology to 
“nature”, and by trying to find some solutions, even though his solutions are not able to 
adequately suppress the unprecedented exploitation of “nature”. As a proposal, he invites 
us all to take personal responsibility for the maintenance of human life. In his view, it is 
through our own responsibility that we will be able to control and slow down the progress 
of technology: “the duty to preserve this physical world in such a state that the conditions 
for that presence remain intact; which in turn means protecting the world’s vulnerability 
from what could imperil those very conditions.”46 This will allow us to curb the dangers 
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and threats we expose “nature” to through technology, and hence, to ensure the survival 
and existence of our species on Earth. 
 With Jonas, we have traced the intrinsic value of “nature” and its vulnerability in 
order to highlight the reason why we have to take responsibility to safeguard it. First of 
all, we have found that “nature”, similar to any human being, also has an end in itself 
demanding respect and protection. Secondly, due to the overexploitation and use from 
science and technology, “nature” has started losing its organization that maintains life on 
earth. In order to curb this technological threat of “nature”, Jonas invites everyone to take 
responsibility for protecting “nature” in order to ensure the existence of the human 
species in the future.  
I. 4. c) The responsibility models of Hans Jonas 
 Throughout this research we constantly evoke these two terms “Responsibility 
Principle” which are indeed two paradigmatic terms in Hans Jonas’s major work in the 
field of environmental ethics with his book entitled The Imperative of Responsibility, in 
Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age. We intend to turn to the two models of 
responsibility that Hans Jonas proposed in his “Responsibility Principle”. However, even 
before presenting these two models of responsibility, we must seek to understand the 
meaning he gives to the term of “responsibility”. In Jonas’s book The Imperative of 





“At any rate, the starry-eyed ethics of perfectibility has to give way to the sterner one of 
responsibility. The latter is not devoid of hope, but gives also fear its rightful place. Its heart 
is veneration for the image of man, turning into trembling concern for its vulnerability.”47 
The vulnerability of “others” requires ipso facto a response from man in light of 
his capacity to act freely. For Jonas, it’s precisely the vulnerability of “others” that is the 
catalyst of his term “ Responsibility”.  According to him, man should feel responsible for 
“others”, for “nature”, because of nature’s vulnerability and inability to protect itself by 
itself.   
As we have seen in the first section of this endeavour with the ontology of 
Heidegger, man as a “Being” can give sense and meaning to his life, his existence, only 
in his relation to the “other”. In his essence as a “Being”, which is founded on his 
openness and his relationship to “others”, according to Heidegger, man cannot give sense 
to his existence without “others”. Remember that, with Jonas, the term “others” does not 
only refer to man, but also to “nature” in a global sense. The difference between the 
Heideggerian and Jonassian concept of man is that Jonas’s concept gives meaning not 
only to his own existence with his relationship to “others,” but also to the existence of 
“others” with whom he has relations. We might better understand Jonas’s conception of 
the term “responsibility” in the following quote from Greisch in the preface of his French 
translation of Jonas’ The Imperative of Responsibility, in Search of an Ethics for the 
Technological Age: 
“Accepter d’être « prise en otage » par ce qu’il y a de plus fragile et de plus menacé. Que 
nous le voulions ou non, nous sommes les architectes de la société à venir, car il ne nous 
appartient déjà plus d’enrayer le progrès technologique, même si nous le voulions. Ce qui 
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nous appartient en revanche, c’est la conscience que nous sommes dores et déjà pris en otage 
par cet avenir que nous faisons exister.”48  
 It is in this perspective that Jonas proposes to us two different models of 
responsibility: Parents and Politicians. According to Jonas, these two figures are 
emblematic of our society. They also have three concepts in common including “totality”, 
“continuity” and “future”, which he considers to be the foundation of existence and well 
being of humanity. These three concepts are complete in that they encompass all aspects 
of their subjects: on one side, the children, for parental responsibility, and on the other 
side, the citizens with regards to the politician’s responsibility. These duties cannot be 
discontinued or stopped for no reason. As Jonas stated, “ continuity” simply means that 
responsibilities of that kind (unlike limited ones) have no pause as long as they last and 
permit no “vacation” from their duties.49 According to Jonas, the concept of “future” 
means that the responsibility of parents and politicians to their “subjects” is beyond the 
immediate present. The past is less important, since parents and politicians place more 
value on future goals and plans for their subjects, rather than the past experiences of their 
subjects. These three concepts “totality”, “continuity” and “future” are critical to Jonas’s 
concept of Responsibility due to their emphasis and their focus on man’s responsibility to 
man, as we can understand in Jonas’s words:  
“What is common to them can be summed up in the three concepts of ‘totality’, 
‘continuity’ and ‘future,’ referring to the existence and welfare of ‘human existence’. It has 
the precarious, vulnerable and revocable character, the peculiar mode of transience, of all 
life, which makes it alone a proper object of ‘caring’, and, moreover, it shares with the 
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agent subject the humanum, which has the first, if not the sole, claim on him. Responsibility 
is first and foremost of men for men. This subject-object kinship in the relation of 
responsibility implies that the relation, though unilateral in itself and in every single case, is 
yet, on principle, reversible and includes possible reciprocity.”50 
 However, despite their points of convergence, the two models of responsibility, 
Parent and Politician, remain contrary and even opposed, according to the nature of their 
objects. They are different, according to Jonas, due to multiple reasons. Firstly, according 
to Jonas, parental responsibility is to be for the rare prominent individual only, whereas 
the politician responsibility is (as a rule and for a time) to be everyone. Secondly, objects 
of the parental responsibility are the few, intimately related fruits of the parents’ own 
procreation, each counting in its singular identity, yet still unfinished; whereas object of 
the politician responsibility are the many, nameless, in themselves already finished 
members of the pre-existing society, who yet are ignored precisely in their individual 
identities […]”51. Moreover, the parental responsibility it depends in no way on any prior 
consent, it is irrevocable, since it is given naturally to parents without any conventional 
law from humans, and this implicates that nothing can change this responsibility or take it 
away from the parents. The politician’s responsibility, on the other hand, is by nature a 
completely conventional responsibility; one which requires a choice, acceptance and 
approval of the citizen, in a pre-existing society, more specifically in a democratic nation. 
It is a self-chosen responsibility, as Jonas states in his book entitled On Faith, Reason 
and Responsibility: 
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“The paradigm case is the politician, who seeks power in order to gain responsibility, and 
supreme power for the sake of supreme responsibility. Power, to be sure, has its own lures 
and rewards- prestige, glamour, the enjoyment of authority, of commanding and initiating, 
the inscribing of one’s trace in the world, even the enjoyment of the mere consciousness of 
it (not to speak of the vulgar gain).”52 
 According to Jonas, parental responsibility is the model of any responsibility 
because it takes care of a direct relationship of man to man: “the archetype of 
responsibility is the care of parent for child, where the goal of parenting is the 
perpetuation of the capacity for responsibility itself.”53 Through this parental 
responsibility, Jonas makes us understand clearly that it not “nature” in its vulnerability 
that we have to take responsibility for, but rather the existence of humanity that is 
dependent on “nature”. Therefore, by extension, “nature” has to be protected and 
preserved as well. 
 We can agree with Jonas on some points that parents and politicians are 
undeniably two models of responsibility in our society. However, we are not entirely 
convinced that these models of responsibility are sufficiently relevant as solutions, or at 
least as paradigms, that will allow us to curb the threats and dangers to which we expose 
“nature”. The parental responsibility, different from the responsibility to future 
generations, is immediate and concrete, i.e. the parents and the children are not two 
individuals that are living in two different temporalities. They are two individuals living 
in the “hinc et nunc”, in the same timeline. For the politician’s responsibility, their 
objects are living in perfectly synchronized relationship with them. On the contrary, this 
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responsibility for future generations, stipulated by Jonas in his “Responsibility Principle” 
refers to two different individuals living in a disproportional line of time who never have 
any relationship in the “hic et nunc”, despite the three aspects of totality, continuity and 
future of Jonas’s parental and politician’s responsibility models that we addressed 
previously in this subsection. This makes it somehow irrelevant for us to commit 
ourselves to taking responsibility if we are concerned only with the present moment and 
the present individual with whom we are in concrete and immediate relation. 
We recognize that Hans Jonas was one of the first thinkers and philosophers who 
had the courage and the audacity to unveil in ethics the origins of the problem of 
environmental crisis in which we find ourselves today. However, Jonas has not really 
given us tangible and relevant solutions to these crises, apart from his new conception of 
ethics that embraces his ecological imperative, his renunciation of the concrete utopia and 
Marxism Bloch’s project and his two models of responsibility. As he admits in his book 
entitled Memoirs: 
“I should add that not all the reactions to The Imperative of Responsibility were positive. 
In retrospect, I would say that the political implications of my thinking – the renunciation 
of utopias as well as the skepticism toward democracy’s ability to meet the challenges of 
the future – were probably the most controversial.”54 
 Furthermore, with his “Responsibility Principle”, it seems more obvious to us that Jonas, 
with his new stance on ethics, did not aim to protect “nature” for itself, but rather to 
protect “nature” in order to preserve the existence of humanity on Earth. We can better 
understand this by the following statement from Jonas’s book entitled On Faith, Reason 
and Responsibility: 
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“In the choice between man and nature, as the struggle for existence poses it time 
and again, man of course comes first, and nature, even when allowing for her own rights, 
must give way to his superior right.”55 
We have scrutinized Jonas’s “Responsibility Principle” by addressing his 
ecological imperative, his concept of “nature” in its value and vulnerability and his two 
models of responsibility. With the ecological imperative of Jonas, we have shown the 
convergence and similarity between the Jonassian and Kantian imperatives; where Jonas, 
contrary to Kant, uses humans’ feelings instead of reason as the foundation of his 
ecological imperative. Through this ecological imperative, Jonas seeks to defend the 
obligation to maintain the existence of the human species in its authenticity. With the 
concept of “nature”, with its value and vulnerability, Jonas tries to prove to us why we 
have to protect and safeguard “nature”. According to him, “nature” has an end in itself, 
which demands protection, rights and respect. Jonas maintains that we have to take 
responsibility for curbing the progress of technology that constitutes to threaten “nature” 
and the existence of human life on earth. With the two models of responsibility, Jonas 
explains why we have to take responsibility for maintaining the existence of humanity on 
earth. Now we will further dissect the Jonassian “Responsibility Principle” in order to 
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II. Hans Jonas and contemporary debates in environmental ethics  
 We now begin the second part of our research by addressing these three 
contemporary philosophers and their approaches to environmental ethics: Ulrich Beck, 
Bryan Norton and J. Baird Callicott. We will try to show whether these philosophers 
were or were not influenced by Hans Jonas and his “Responsibility Principle”, in order to 
answer the question of our thesis, namely: What is the significance and impact of the 
“Responsibility Principle” in contemporary environmental debates? To do so, we will 
divide this second part of our research work into two sections. In the first section, we will 
examine Ulrich Beck and his “Principle of Precaution” in comparison to the Jonassian 
“Responsibility Principle” in order to highlight the points of convergence or divergence 
between these two thinkers in their interpretations and solutions to environmental ethics. 
In the second section, we will contrast Bryan Norton with J. Baird Callicott according to 
their views on environmental values, in order to see what affect Jonas’s “Responsibility 
Principle” would have on these contemporary philosophers. 
II. 1 Ulrich Beck and the “responsibility principle” of Hans Jonas 
 Ulrich Beck, a contemporary philosopher and fervent defender of nature’s 
protection from the technological threats of our current or post-modern society, unlike his 
predecessor Jonas, sees ecology not as a principle of responsibility but as a “Principle of 
Precaution”. His aim is to respond and cope with the deterioration of nature caused by the 
excessive use of the techno-scientific means and over-exploitation of nature. Beck 
believes that this “Principle of Precaution” responds much better to globalization and the 




chapter of his book, La Société du Risque, sur la Voie d’une autre Modernité, Beck 
expresses this concern the precautionary principle, in the following terms: 
“Il n’est plus possible- comme c’était le cas des risques industriels et professionnels du XIXe 
et de la première moitié du XXe siècle - de cantonner ces risques à un espace ou à un lieu 
déterminé. On observe une tendance à la globalisation qui touche la production et la 
reproduction, et transcende les frontières des États-nations. On voit apparaitre des menaces 
globales transnationales et non spécifiques à une classe déterminées, qui s’accompagnent 
d’une dynamique sociale et politique nouvelle.”56  
 Beck questions the fact that, despite the scale and globalization of these threats, 
the institutions concerned do not seek to value the importance and the seriousness of the 
situation. On the contrary, in his opinion, these institutions seek instead to legally spread 
out these risks, resulting in effects on the daily consumption of the world’s population: in 
the water we drink, the air we breathe, the food we eat and the products we use. Beck 
examined this phenomenon in the first chapter of his book La Société du risque, sur la 
voie d’une autre modernité under the name of “latent induced effects”: 
“Comment les risques et les menaces qui sont systématiquement produits au cours du 
processus de modernisation avancée peuvent-ils être supprimés, diminués, dramatisés, 
canalisés, et, dans le cas où ils ont pris la forme d’« effets induits latents », endigués et 
évacués de sorte qu’ils ne gênent pas le processus de modernisation ni ne franchissent les 
limites de ce qui est ” tolérable ”?”57 
For Beck, it is not only a question of safeguarding “nature”, of ensuring the survival of 
humanity, but of solving the underlying problems that lie at the root and foundation of all 
the degradation of humanity. This fragment from his book, entitled La Société du risque, 
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sur la voie d’une autre modernité, can help us to better understand Beck’s perspective on 
the risks associated with modernisation: 
“Il ne s’agit donc plus ou plus uniquement de rentabiliser la nature, de libérer l’homme des 
contraintes traditionnelles, mais aussi et avant tout de résoudre des problèmes induits par le 
développement technico-économique lui même. Le processus de modernisation devient 
“réflexif”, il est à lui-même objet de réflexion et problème.”58  
   Beck, with his “Principle of Precaution”, directs ecology towards a paradigm 
much more relevant than that of Jonas. He addresses the problems of the environmental 
crisis in a much deeper and concrete way, by unveiling the cause of the technological 
risks by looking at the “latent induced effects” of the products of consumption and use. 
However, we do not see how Beck will apply his “Principle of Precaution” in institutions 
and in present society without awareness and responsibility among all the actors 
concerned, without a return to the constitutional laws and norms of our institutions and of 
our current society. The presence of these latent toxic substances in the food humans 
consume, in the pesticides humans use, in the air humans breathe, in the water that 
humans drink, is quite legitimate and lawful with respect to the geo-politico-economic 
laws of our institutions and society. As humans, we also demonstrate acceptance, 
tranquility, or perhaps a blinding, normal ignorance of the consumption and use of these 
toxic products that science and technology offers us.  
 We will need a “tabula rasa”, a starting point in the foundations and principles of 
the constitutions and laws of our institutions and of our present society in order to curb 
and possibly eradicate the presence of these “latent induced effects”, which, according to 
Beck, are at the root of the dangers and threats associated with modernization. Such a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




step backwards in the constitutional laws and norms of our institutions and our society 
would require a redefinition, a new conception of “nature” and of the environment. We 
will examine this in the next section of our research when we encounter and come to 
understand the work of ecologist Callicott and his concept of the “intrinsic value of 
nature”. Once we recognize the value of nature, its essential and indispensable role in the 
maintenance of life on earth, we will be able to solve the problems of the dangers and 
threats related to modernization. 
 Hans Jonas, with his “Responsibility Principle”, was one of the first philosophers 
of his time who sought to see ethics as a relation between Man and nature, raising the 
problems of the danger and the threat of technology and science to nature. In his opinion, 
these technological dangers and threats could lead to the disappearance of life on earth. 
To follow up on this Jonassian “Responsibility Principle” and to find a new solution to 
these technological risks, which beset nature, Beck seeks to categorize these risks and 
threats into two groups: the invisible and visible traits of technological risk.  
II. 1. a) Ulrich Beck and the invisibility of technological threats  
 It is indeed against the invisible traits of technological risks that Beck seeks to 
defend the fate of “nature” and the human species in his “Principle of Precaution”. 
Additionally, he affirms that these risks are invisible, but that does not mean they are not 
real or that they don’t have long-term consequences for future generations. According to 
him, despite their invisibility, these risks sooner or later will destroy and annihilate the 
existence of human life on Earth. We do not see them, we do not feel them and we cannot 
touch them, but they are legitimately there in our food, in the air, in the water and in our 




our institutions. In order to legitimize and legalize these toxic substances, Beck says our 
institutions insert them in our consumption and products according to a non-disturbing, 
acceptable, low percentage quantity known as the “limit rate”. This is done with the 
rationale that it will not cause harm or immediate effects on human life, even if this leads 
to deadly consequences for the future. Beck affirms this in his book, entitled La Société 
du risque, sur la voie d’une autre modernité: 
“Les taux limites de présence « acceptable » de substances polluantes et toxique dans l’air, 
l’eau et l’alimentation sont à la répartition du risque ce qu’est le principe du mérite à 
l’inégale répartition des richesses: ils réussissent le tour de force d’autoriser les émissions 
polluantes tout en légitimant leur existence, tant qu’elle se cantonne en deça des valeurs 
établies. En limitant la pollution, on fait le jeu de la pollution.”59 
 Furthermore, Beck tells us that the worst thing is that this “limit rate”, which 
science and our institutions legitimize and legalize in the products that we are consuming 
and using, is not always adhered to since they often exceed the “limit rate” on those 
products. For Beck, the correct and sensible solution would be to ban all toxic substances 
in consumption and use. Unfortunately, this solution has been rejected since it is 
impossible in its application. Even so, according to Beck and probably following Hans 
Jonas’s thinking, we must seek to apprehend these invisible risks that are gradually 
destroying nature and destroying the existence of life on earth, especially the existence of 
human life. To do so, Beck, in his book entitled La Société du risque, sur la voie d’une 
autre modernité, maintains that we have to appeal to science in order to have at our 
disposal tools and means capable of letting us detect and control these technological 
risks: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




“ Les risques qui sont actuellement au centre des préoccupations sont de plus en plus 
fréquemment des risques qui ne sont ni visibles ni tangibles pour les personnes qui y sont 
exposées, des risques qui parfois même restent sans effet du vivant des personnes concernées, 
mais en ont pour leur descendance, des risques en tout état de cause qui ont besoin du recours 
aux «  organes de perception » de la science – théories, expérience, instruments de mesure – 
pour pouvoir devenir « visibles », interprétables en tant que risques .”60 
 On the other hand, Beck and Jonas do not neglect or deny the dilemma between a 
total abandonment and the partial integration of these “latent induced effects” in our 
products of consumption and use. Giving up completely the integration of toxic 
substances in our products of consumption seems to be impossible due to the benefits 
these products offer. For example, sodium benzonate and potassium sorbate are common 
additives in food products used to preserve food longer so that it can stay on shelves and 
not expire quickly. Additionally, glyphosate and metolachlor are examples of common 
desiccants/herbicides used in agriculture to kill pests and unwanted weeds that may 
prevent or limit the growth of various crops. However, even accepting these chemicals in 
small quantities has heavy consequences for human life and its existence. According to 
Beck, the first option should be the lesser of two evils since it would not put any life in 
danger; however, that idea is found chimerical by many due to the necessity and 
importance of those “latent induced effects” in these products.  While it is true that the 
end does not always justify the means, in this case “latent induced effects” from the small 
quantity of toxic substances are compelling and necessary to integrate in some of our 
products of consumption and use. This integration is necessary to reduce the rate of 
famine and make certain populations less dependent and more autonomous in regards to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




other rich countries. Nitrogen and ammonium nitrate, for example, are synthetic 
fertilizers that help farmers to grow their crops at a much larger size and shorter period of 
time. Beck tries to make us understand this in his book entitled La Société du risque, sur 
la voie d’une autre modernité, affirming that: 
“Entre la menace visible de mourir de faim et la menace invisible d’une mort par 
intoxication, c’est l’évidence de la lutte contre la misère matérielle qui l’emporte. Sans 
l’utilisation massive de substances chimiques, les rendements des champs baisseraient et les 
insectes et les champignons engloutiraient une partie des récoltes. Avec la chimie, les pays 
pauvres de la périphérie peuvent couvrir leurs besoins alimentaires, ils gagnent un peu 
d’indépendance par rapport aux métropoles du pouvoir du monde industriel.”61  
It is the reason why, according to Beck, scientists and some concerned institutions, such 
as the “FDA” (Food and Drug Administration) founded in 1906 in North America (USA), 
seek to justify and legalise these toxic substances that are consumed and used among the 
United States’ population. 
 In this subsection, Beck denounces the “latent induced effects” in the products of 
our consumption and use that are imperceptible but constitute the main risk and threat for 
“nature” and the existence of human life on earth. The chemicals found in these products 
are more dangerous because they apparently don’t represent any danger or risk in an 
immediate way, but over time latently destroy the very condition of human life on earth.  
We can see here a close similarity between the approach of both Jonas and Beck with 
respect to the interpretation they both have on the progress of technology.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




II. 1. b) Ulrich Beck and the visibility of technological threats  
 Beck, with his “Principle of Precaution”, not only seeks to denounce the 
technological risks of invisible traits, but also aims to denounce the technological risks of 
visible traits that constitute a tangible and obvious part in the destruction and degradation 
of “nature”. With the denunciation of these visible risks, Beck clearly joins Jonas in his 
effort to fight against the technological threats that we expose “nature” to, which could 
eventually extinguish the human species. These technological risks with visible traits 
highlighted by these two thinkers concern all and every species on earth, since they are 
physically destroying “nature”, the one and only “Habitat” for the existence of life that 
we know so far (until proof of the contrary). According to Beck in his book entitled La 
Société du risque, sur la voie d’une autre modernité, they are obvious and tangible in the 
problems of deforestation, climate change, air pollution and water pollution: 
“ La détérioration et la destruction de la nature n’ont plus lieu dans la sphère des chaines de 
conséquences chimico-physico-biologiques soustraites à l’expérience personnelle, elles 
deviennent de plus en plus perceptibles pour la vue, l’odorat et l’ouïe. Nous n’évoquerons 
que les phénomènes les plus frappants: la détérioration galopante des forêts, la pollution des 
nappes phrénatiques et des mers, la présence de cadavres d’animaux couverts de pétrole, le 
smog, l’érosion des bâtiments et des monuments artistiques par la pollution, des catastrophes, 
à quoi s’ajoutent les comptes-rendus des médias. La liste des substances toxiques et 
polluantes présentes dans l’alimentation et les objets de la vie quotidienne ne cesse de 
s’allonger. ”62  
 Remember that J. B. Callicott in his distinction between ecologists, enumerated 
three categories of ecologists: the ecocentrists, the extentionists and all of those who see 
ecology as a kind of “applied ethics” by the fact that they are most focused on the socio-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




political-economic problems linked to the environmental crisis of today. Among these 
three categories, we had considered Jonas to belong to the third, i.e. as an environmental 
theorist who sees ecology as a type of applied ethics, recognizing that the problem of this 
environmental crisis is rooted in the progress of technology. As we know, technology is 
also one of the socio-political-economic problems of said environmental crisis. Beck, 
according to his interpretation of environmental ethics, could also be considered in this 
category of ecologists who sees ecology as a type of applied ethics, since he, as well as 
Jonas, finds the problem of this environmental crisis in technology. In his book 
“Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk”, Ecology, as a movement, is not an environmental 
movement but rather a social movement, since it aims far from seeking to defend nature 
against the risks of techno-science, but to ensure and preserve the existence of humanity 
on earth: 
“The ecological movement is not an environmental movement but a social, inward movement 
which utilizes ‘nature” as a parameter for certain questions. These owe the attention accorded 
them to every one’s growing horror at the fact that what it had been supposed we could 
foresee has taken root in a foreseeably unforeseeable jeopardization, not only of nature, but 
also of leisure, recreation, health, life, capital, property, performance.”63  
 With Beck, we have addressed in this subsection the impacts of the visible and 
invisible technological threats on the degradation of “nature” and the destruction of life 
on earth. It is now fairly obvious for us to see a correlation between the “Principle of 
Precaution” and the Jonassian “Responsibility Principle”. As in Jonas’s “Responsibility 
Principle”, Beck’s “Principle of Precaution” also aims to slow down the progress of 
technology that implicitly degrades and destroys nature and the existence of the human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





species on earth. It is true that Jonas and Beck take a different approach to coping with 
these technological threats; however, they both in fact see in technology the foundation of 
the environmental crisis that we are facing today, which enables us to confirm that 
Jonas’s “Responsibility Principle” has a coherent filiation with Beck’s “Principle of 
Precaution”. As Hicham-Stéphane Afeissa, philosophy professor at the Academie de 
Dijon, mentioned in her work entitled De l’éthique environnementale au principe 
responsabilité et retour: 
 “Il vaut d’être remarqué que le diagnostic Jonassien est étonnamment proche de celui 
qu’avance Ulrich Beck au sujet de la désormais fameuse “ société du risqué” (Beck, 2001). 
En effet, lui aussi estime que nous sommes entrés de plain-pied dans une nouvelle forme de 
société caractérisée par les implications imprévisibles de nos interventions technologiques 
dans la nature à l’échelle mondiale.”64 
II. 2 B. Norton and J. B. Callicott and the “Responsibility Principle” of H. Jonas  
 It is important to understand that in North America, ethics were concerned only 
with the activities and relationships between humans. “Nature” was considered a means 
to the disposition and the needs of human beings. Eager to promote the cause of nature, 
Aldo Leopold, with his book entitled “A Sand County Almanac” published in 1949, 
sought to change and redefine anthropocentric ethics in order to give “nature” a place and 
a value equal to humans: 
“Selon Léopold, l’éthique a jusqu’à présent concerné exclusivement les relations internes aux 
communautés humaines. Nous avons désormais besoin d’une nouvelle éthique, affirme t’il 
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dans les années 1940, chargée de définir la relation de l’homme à la terre (land), aux animaux 
et aux plantes qui vivent dessus.”65  
According to Aldo Leopold, “ethics” do not only come to embrace the relationship 
between humans and humans, but also the relationship between humans and “nature”. 
This has since changed the concept of the value of “nature” in many ecological debates in 
North America. Similarly to Jonas, “Leopold seeks to defend ‘nature’ and human 
existence against the progress of technology”66 through his work. We can better 
understand Leopold’s position to science and technology in his book entitled The River of 
the Mother of God and Other Essays when he questions whether or not all inventions and 
technological progress will compromise the existence of life on earth: 
 “We of the machine age admire ourselves for our mechanical ingenuity; we harness cars to 
the solar energy impounded in carboniferous forests; we fly in mechanical birds; we make 
the ether carry our words even our pictures. But are these not in one sense mere parlor 
tricks compared with our utter ineptitude in keeping land fit to live on?”67 
 In this final section of our endeavour, we will address these two contemporary 
environmentalist philosophers, Bryan Norton and J. Baird Callicott, and their opposition 
to the concept of the value of nature, despite the fact they both have the foundation of 
their ecological view in the same thinker: Aldo Leopold. If for Hans Jonas in his 
“Responsibility Principle”, “nature” was considered not only as an instrument for humans 
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but also an end in itself, deserving respect, rights and protection, with these two 
ecologists the concept of nature will create a significant divergence in their effort to find 
a solution to the environmental crisis we are in today. On one hand, we have Bryan 
Norton, who with his pragmatist view of environmental ethics seeks to find the solution 
to the environmental crisis in the value of nature in an extrinsic way. On the other hand, 
we have J. Baird Callicott, who with his ecocentrist view of environmental ethics seeks 
instead to find the solution to the environmental crisis in the value of “nature” in an 
intrinsic way.  
II. 2. a) Hans Jonas and the pragmatism of Bryan Norton 
 Bryan Norton, in contrast to Jonas, doesn’t seek to find the solution of the 
environmental crisis in a non-anthropocentric concept of environmental values. In 
Norton’s view, only with “Pragmatism” will man be able to maintain his existence on 
earth, by conferring to “nature” an extrinsic value. According to him, practical experience 
and a language more adapted and appropriate to ecology will enable us to eradicate the 
dangers and threats that nature and the existence of human life face today. Norton 
affirmed that the major dilemma that “Ecology” suffers with the environmental values is 
based on the monistic and universal theory of values with the “Economism”68 and  
“Intrinsic Value theory”69. According to Norton, ecology is powerless to solve the 
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problems and dangers that “nature” and human existence face today, because it does not 
have an adequate language to discuss these dangers and problems in each of our 
community. As he states it in his book entitled Sustainability, A Philosophy of Adaptive 
Ecosystem Management: 
“Pragmatists aspire to an ideal of a unified conception of inquiry in which philosophers are 
one kind of workers in a larger enterprise. Pragmatists seek a unified method of inquiry – a 
method that is self-correcting, based in experience, but also involving interpretation and 
theory- building.”70   
 According to Norton, all of the failures we face today with the environmental 
crisis are due to the fact that we do not seek to solve the environmental issues from a 
more pluralist and local point of view, alongside of a language that’s well adapted to the 
environmental issues in each of our communities. In Norton’s view, because of the 
dichotomy existing between intrinsic value and instrumental value of “nature”, the 
bipolar formulation of environmental valuation, the monistic theories of values and the 
placeless or universal theories of values, it is difficult and even impossible with the 
Economists and Intrinsic Value theorists to incorporate environmental science and 
environmental values into pertinent and authentic debates that would lead us to new 
formulations of laws and principles for the protection and respect of “nature”. 
Additionally, according to Norton, the language we use now focuses all environmental 
ethics debates on environmentalist ideologies, which do not offer any practical solutions 
to the problems we are facing today. This affirmation from his book entitled, 
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“Sustainability, A Philosophy of Adaptive Ecosystem Management” can help us better 
understand his concern about the lack of language in environmental ethics: 
“What is even more interesting is that these shared assumptions about the nature of 
environmental values are all questionable if individually and separately and also questionable 
taken together, as a general understanding of what we need in the way of a theory of 
environmental value. The advocates of these theories understand the problem of 
environmental valuation as a problem of classifying entities as either instrumentally or 
intrinsically valuable on the very general, ontological scale; they then seek to maximize a 
very abstract and placeless value, a value that derives none of its efficacy from the 
distinctiveness and unique charms of a place. Indeed, it is these four-shared assumptions 
about how to value the environment that create the tendency toward polarization in 
environmental ethics and environmental policy discussions, and toward ideological 
environmentalism more generally.”71  
 Here, we challenge the pragmatic view on environmental ethics of Norton to 
determine if it provides sufficient solutions to solve environmental crises. Even if man 
uses language to communicate, interact, and exchange ideas with one another, this does 
not mean, in any sense, that language alone can motivate in man an awareness of and 
responsibility toward the problem of the deterioration and destruction of “nature”. Norton 
advocates for a practical experience that remains too vague for us to understand, since it 
does not take into account the conditions of the people concerned.  The experience is 
certainly necessary, but what kind of experience does Norton want to share with us? Is it 
the experience of the farmer in a third world country who cultivates his crops in order to 
provide only for his family, without any tools and/or chemical fertilizers used in the 
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production of his food? Or is it the experience of the farmer in a developed country who 
has all of the tools and chemical products/fertilizers at his disposal, which allow him to 
grow tons and tons of crops?  
It is difficult to determine the relative importance of language and experience that 
Norton praises in his pragmatic approach to environmental ethics, which is justified by 
several reasons. First of all, such language will in no way help us to act responsibly to 
protect “nature” and preserve the existence of human life on Earth, since his pragmatic 
approach does not take into consideration the differences in opportunity and education 
level of each individual in the society in question. The environmental crisis we are facing 
today cannot only be solved with the pluralistic and local point of view of Norton’s 
pragmatism, since it is not only a local problem, but also rather a transnational issue. 
Every nation has to be involved in solving these many issues of the environmental crisis 
we are facing today, by creating some universal and durable laws and principles to 
protect the environment.  
 Additionally, this new pragmatic interpretation of environmental ethics does not 
remain without criticism from other ecologists of the contemporary era, especially 
Callicott. According to the latter, such a conception of ethics, founded on 
anthropocentrism, would do much more harm than benefit to “nature” and the 
preservation of the human species on Earth. This is what Jonas, from his point of view of 
ethics, would also assert. Moreover, it was against this anthropocentric conception of the 
ethics of his time that Jonas was able to create his “Responsibility Principle”, aiming to 
counteract and contradict certain philosophical thinkers, especially the philosopher 




Norton does not hide his adversity or opposition to the Jonassian “Responsibility 
Principle”. In fact, he asserts his opposition implicitly in his book, entitled Sustainability, 
A Philosophy of Adaptive Ecosystem Management, when he affirms that true pragmatism 
must be based on experience alone and not on forms of preconceived principle, theory or 
paradigm: 
“Real pragmatism stands for the direct opposite of what he calls traditional pragmatism. Real 
pragmatism stands for acting, for experimentation – for relying on experience, not on 
preconceived principle.”72   
 In addition to this implicit attack on the Jonassian “Responsibility Principle”, 
Norton also directly and openly attacks Callicott by criticizing him for denying or 
doubting that Aldo Leopold also had links and relationships with at least one of the 
founders of the current pragmatism, namely Arthur Twining Hadley. In Norton’s opinion, 
experience is the only way we, as human beings, can learn the truth about the future of 
everything on Earth. He also made clear in his book, “Sustainability, a Philosophy of 
Adaptive Ecosystem Management”:  
“J. Baird Callicott, who has publicly doubted that Leopold has pragmatist leanings, has also 
publicly ridiculed the idea that Leopold relied on the work of Hadley, arguing that the use of 
the pragmatic definition was ‘ironically’ intended.”73  
 Despite his fervent defense of such a pragmatic approach toward the ecology of 
Aldo Leopold, Norton has not proven clearly the links of the latter with Arthur Twining 
Hadley, the pioneer and founder of “pragmatism”. Norton simply mentions that Aldo 
Leopold has extracted the key ideas of his so-called pragmatic ecological view from the 
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ecology of Arthur Twining Hadley, without really explaining in a clear and detailed way 
these links between Aldo Leopold and Arthur T. Hadley, while the latter was president of 
Yale University: 
“Leopold’s most direct contact with pragmatists, as far as we know, was with Arthur 
Twining Hadley, who was president of Yale University when Leopold studied science, and 
then forestry, there from 1905 to 1909.”74  
 In this subsection, we have shown the divergence that exists in Jonas’s work and 
Norton’s pragmatic view on environmental ethics. Contrarily to Jonas, Norton seeks to 
solve the problems of the environmental crisis in a pragmatic way, where only practical 
experience and a more adaptive language could curd all of the danger and threats that 
“nature” is exposed to. Thus, we can confirm that the “Responsibility Principle” of Jonas 
did not have any real significance or impact on Norton’s pragmatic view on ethics.   
II. 2. b) Hans Jonas and the ecocentrism of J. Baird Callicott  
 With J. B. Callicott, the ecology movement takes again a different approach. 
According to him, the root of all the dangers and threats facing “nature” today is related 
to the extrinsic value that man grants to “nature”. In Callicott’s opinion, we are not going 
to be able to solve the problem of the dangers and threats linked to modernization which 
“nature” is facing today, if we do not at first try to see “nature” not as a means but as an 
“end” in itself, an end in itself that deserves respect, rights and dignity in the same way as 
the human species. He goes on to maintain that nature is not “the other” of the human 
species; quite the contrary, man is an integral part of “nature”. If man has a value in 
himself, dignity and rights, it is one more reason why “nature” also has value in itself, 
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dignity and rights. Since man is not an entity placed outside of “nature”, he is part of 
“nature” and depends on “nature.” According to Callicott, we should not even talk about 
environmental ethics if nature didn’t have an intrinsic value, an end in itself:  
“Si la valeur intrinsèque fait défaut à la nature, alors l’éthique environnementale n’est en 
effet rien d’autre qu’une application particulière de l’éthique qui règle les relations entre les 
hommes. Pour dire la même chose autrement, si la valeur intrinsèque fait défaut à la nature, 
alors toute éthique environnementale non anthropocentriste est disqualifiée.”75  
 Considering nature as an end in itself, which demands respect, dignity and the 
same rights as human beings, this could also lead to other conceptual challenges that are 
much more complicated and difficult to solve. Of course, it will not be a problem of the 
same significance as the ecological crisis, that would cause more risks and threats to 
“nature” and the existence of life on Earth; rather, it will be a problem that would require 
a total reformulation of the judicial, political, economic and social laws of all countries in 
the world. This implies that it’s not only a matter of awareness and individual or 
collective responsibility, but also a geo-politico-economic-social affair of all the 
countries of the world. All these countries should change their constitutions and laws 
with a view to regulating and legitimizing nature in its enjoyment of all the rights and 
respects it demands as an end in itself. 
 Despite the limitations and weaknesses of this ecological approach, it could 
remain among the ecological approaches with which we have already dealt with in the 
preceding section of this endeavour, one of the most relevant and adapted approaches to 
the ecological crisis of our era, in the sense that it seeks to eradicate in a definitive and 
general manner the foundation of all the dangers and threats of which “nature” is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




object. It encompasses all the nations of the world to review their legal and constitutional 
laws in order to give “nature” its real and authentic value, a value that is neither superior 
nor inferior to that which has been attributed to the human species. This approach goes 
beyond the responsibility of the individual. Far from encouraging man to save “nature”, 
as well as human existence, it requires the respect of nature’s rights: right of existence, 
right to be protected, etc. Hence it can be said that the responsibility of the person is 
governed here not by fear, as Jonas would have us believe, but rather by well-established 
laws for the protection and dignity of “nature”. 
  In addition to being one of the most relevant approaches to the problem of the 
environmental crisis, the ecological view of Callicott is also one of the contemporary 
approaches of environmental ethics that has in his foundation and his notions the same 
concept of “nature” defended by Jonas in his “Responsibility Principle”. Callicott also 
believes that a reformulation of ethics towards a relationship not only between humans to 
humans, but also between humans to “nature” is necessary in order to solve the problems 
of this environmental crisis.  
II. 2. c) Hans Jonas and the value of “nature” with B. Norton and J. Baird Callicott 
 I was fortunate to participate in a debate session with Callicott under the title 
“Convergence and divergence between Animal and Environmental Ethics”, hosted by 
“Centre de Recherche en Éthique– CRÉ” in Montreal, Quebec in May 2017. During this 
debate, we were able to ask him directly a few questions about the notion of intrinsic 
value that he attributes to nature in his interpretation of Aldo Leopold’s “Land Ethic”. It 
was during this debate that we finally apprehended the meaning of Callicott’s concept of 




ecocentrism with the “Responsibility Principle” of Jonas. In his interpretation of the 
“Land Ethic” of Aldo Leopold, Callicott never denied the extrinsic value of “nature”, as 
Norton wanted us to understand. Callicott was only emphasizing that we have to protect 
and conserve “nature” in its integrity, stability and beauty. As he stated very clearly 
during the debates by citing Aldo Leopold: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the 
integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community, it is wrong when it tends 
otherwise—the “golden rule” of the Leopold Land Ethic.” It is precisely this “golden 
rule” of Aldo Leopold’s “Land Ethic”, interpreted by Callicott, that ecologically allows 
us to see a similarity between the Jonassian “Responsibility Principle” and Callicott’s 
ecocentrism.  
 To justify and support his point, Callicott traced an analogy between man and 
“nature”, by explaining how man, despite the fact that he has an official intrinsic value, 
has been exploited and used as instrumental means in the workplace. Callicott shows us 
that even if the intrinsic value of “nature” was officially recognized by all, this would not 
have stopped man from exploiting and using “nature” as instrumental means. As Callicott 
states in his book entitled “Land ethics”:  
        “Les êtres humains, auxquels nous conférons une valeur intrinsèque, n’en sont pas moins 
appelés, dans le contexte professionnel, « ressources humaines ». Bien que nous autres 
employés soyons reconnus comme des fins, nous n’en sommes pas moins utilisés aussi 
comme moyens , en vues des fins de nos employeurs. C’est pourquoi, dans les sociétés qui 
reconnaissent les droits de l’homme, des contraintes éthiques et légales tâchent de limiter 




reconnue, on continuerait d’exploiter la nature, mais de semblables contraintes seraient 
mises en œuvre pour limiter cette exploitation. ”76 
This quote can help us understand that, for Callicott, “nature” has an unofficial intrinsic 
value. However, he does not believe that this intrinsic value would be compelling enough 
to safeguard and protect “nature” if there are no rules or laws that prevent man from 
overexploiting and using “nature”.  
The ecocentrism of Callicott seems to have a deeper filiation with the Jonassian 
concept of the value of “nature”. On the one hand, Jonas seeks to oppose the 
advancement of technology, since it creates and engenders the over-exploitation and 
destabilization of nature’s order, on which the existence of humanity is dependent. On the 
other hand, we have Callicott, who, according to Aldo Leopold’s “Land Ethic”, seeks to 
defend the integrity, stability and beauty of “nature” for itself in order to preserve 
nature’s order and the existence of life on Earth. We can see here that both the Jonassian 
“Responsibility Principle” and the ecocentrism of Callicott aim to defend the existence of 
human life on earth. Callicott’s assertion is better understood according to his 
interpretation of Aldo Leopold’s “Land Ethic”: 
“So any assertion of responsibility of our generation for impacts on future people rests on 
these two assumptions: that our choices have important impacts on future people and the 
choices they face, and that our scientific knowledge is sufficiently reliable that we can 
foresee and plan to avoid negative impacts and encourage benign ones.”77  
We can realize that, at the end, both Jonas and Callicott have the same goal by taking 
different paths and finding different solutions to reach it. With either the opposition to the 
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progress of technology or the defense of integrity, stability and beauty of “nature”, the 
ultimate goal is to preserve life on Earth.  
This goal is also not opposed to that of Norton; his vision of pragmatic or 
anthropocentric ecology also has the good intention of emancipating life on Earth, 
specifically human life. Norton simply takes a path that is opposite to that of Jonas and 
Callicott, a path that, instead of curbing the over-exploitation of nature or guaranteeing 
the stability and integrity of “nature”, merely permits more exploitation and 
destabilization of the order of things in “nature” to achieve. Additionally, according to 
Norton, “nature” has no intrinsic value, as he believes it is simply an instrument in the 
service and at the disposal of human beings. This is precisely one of Callicott’s most 
explicit criticisms of Norton in his interpretation of Aldo Leopold’s “Land Ethic”: 
“ N’en déplaise à mon confrère Bryan Norton, la question de la « valeur intrinsèque » ou de 
la valeur en soi de la nature a été et demeure une pierre de touche centrale pour la 
philosophie de l’écologie…Les anthropocentristes, comme Norton et Hagrove, ont refusé de 
considérer que la nature a une valeur en elle même, réservant une telle « valeur intrinsèque » 
aux seuls êtres humains. Les non-anthropocentristes, c’est- à-dire les autres, sont d’accord 
pour dire que la nature a une valeur intrinsèque, mais divergent pour ce qui concerne l’étendu 
de cette extension morale, et son statut ontologique. Certains prétendent que seuls des 
organismes individuels peuvent avoir une valeur intrinsèque; d’autres (dont je suis) 
considèrent que des « super organismes » comme des espèces, des communautés biotiques, 
des écosystèmes, la biosphère tout entière ont aussi une valeur intrinsèque.”78   
According to Callicott, Norton does not admit any difference between anthropocentric 
environmental ethics and non-anthropocentric environmental ethics, since for him 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




“nature” is treated the same way in either ethical framework; the ultimate goal is the 
conservation of life on earth, especially human life. 
 Let us return again to the resemblance and similarity existing between the 
Jonassian “Responsibility Principle” and the ecocentrism of Callicott. It is not only at the 
level of the ecological foundation of Leopold’s “Land Ethic” that there is similarity 
between Callicott and Jonas, but there may also be a very close connection between the 
evolutionary basis of Leopold’s “Land Ethic” and the Jonassian “Responsibility 
Principle”, according to Callicott. Remember that in the second section of the first part of 
our endeavour, we brought out the ontological foundation of the Jonassian 
“Responsibility Principle” by approaching Kant with his hypothetical imperative. This 
“Kantian hypothetical imperative” reformulated by Jonas in the fourth section of this 
work under the title “New Ecological Imperative”. Jonas, unlike Kant, based his ideas not 
on rational “Beings” and not on Principles or norms, but rather on the feelings of man, 
specifically the feeling of fear known to Jonas under the title of the “heuristic of fear”. 
With Callicott, we will also see this touch of human feeling in the evolutionary 
foundation of said “Land Ethic” of Leopold; since, according to Callicott’s affirmation 
during the May, 2017 Montreal CRÉ debate, this evolutionary foundation of Leopold’s 
“Land Ethic” borrowed from Charles Darwin’s “Descent of Man”, which itself was 
founded on the sentimental morality of David Hume. In the words of Hume, Callicott 
states: 
 “According to Hume, the wellspring of all action, including ethical action, is 
feeling, emotion, passion – affect, not reason. Reason plays a subordinate but 




We do not have sufficient evidence or support to confirm this assertion by Callicott of the 
basis of Leopold’s foundation for his “Land Ethic”, apart from Callicott’s statement in 
the May, 2017 Montreal CRÉ debate. This limited evidence forces us to have some 
reservations about this hypothesis; we do not want this hypothesis to lend confusion to 
the main focus of our research. 
 The relevant facts that we can use to justify the convergence existing between 
these two environmental theorists are: to safeguard “nature” and maintain the existence of 
future generations, we need to change our traditional view of ethics for a new ethics that 
doesn’t only embrace the relationship between man and man, but also the relationship 
between man and “nature”. In this new ethical view, according to these two 
environmental theorists, we will not only confer an extrinsic value to “nature” but we will 
also be able to see “nature” as having an intrinsic value that deserves dignity, rights and 
respect.  
 However, Jonas does not believe that referring to “nature” only with an intrinsic 
value would solve the environmental crisis we are facing today. As Lawrence mentions in 
Jonas's work entitled Mortality and Morality: a Search for Good after Auschwitz: 
 “While many environmentalists presume that nonanthropocentrism must be a defining 
feature of any ecological ethics, Jonas does not believe that overcoming nihilism requires a 
renunciation of anthropocentrism in favor of biocentrism or ecocentrism. Instead, I shall 
contend, he tries to undercut the very distinction between anthropocentrism and its 
supposed alternative.”79  
Jonas believes that it is not the progress of technology in general that threatens the 
existence of future generations, but rather the invention and the use of nuclear 
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bombs. According to Jonas, we do not necessarily have to change the existence of 
all of the technological progress in order to ensure the existence of future 
generations on earth. Alternatively, we just need to make good and adequate 
decisions that can banish the use and the existence of nuclear weapons, in fear that 
they will be responsible for destroying the planet. As Jonas affirms in his work 
entitled On Faith, Reason and Responsibility: 
 “Nuclear weapons can even be abolished without this requiring all of modern existence to 
change. (The prospect is admittedly small.) Anyway, decisions still play a role – and in 
these: fear.”80  
 In this second part of work, we addressed the works of three contemporary 
philosophers in the field of environmental ethics in order to answer our questions about 
the importance of and impact on Jonas's “Responsibility Principle” in contemporary 
philosophical debates. We have shown the similarities and differences existing between 
the “Principle of Precaution” of Beck and the “Responsibility Principle” of Jonas, as well 
as Norton’s pragmatic view on ethics compared to that of Jonas, and finally the 
ecocentrism of Callicott compared to Jonas. According to what was already discussed in 
the second part of this work, we can answer the question of this thesis by confirming that 
Jonas's “Responsibility Principle” has a coherent filiation in light of the philosophical 
debates of Beck and Callicott; however, it is opposed by the philosophical view and 
environmental debate of Norton.  
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  We were able to address briefly and precisely the elements that were deemed 
necessary and essential to achieve our objective, which was indeed to show the 
importance and the impact of the Jonassian “Responsibility Principle” debates on the 
environmental ethics of our present era. 
 In the first part of this work, we have approached the philosophers Heidegger, 
Kant, Bloch and Jonas, the author of principal import to this endeavour. With Heidegger, 
in the first section of this work, we have highlighted the ontological basis of the Jonassian 
“Responsibility Principle”, showing that humanity is formed by two correlational entities: 
his ability of openness and relationship with “Others”. From these two correlational 
entities, man is able to open up to himself and relate himself to “others” (in our case to 
“nature”) in order to maintain his existence in the world. In the second section of this 
work, we have highlighted with Kant the ethical foundation of the Jonassian 
“Responsibility Principle”. It was on the basis of the Kantian hypothetical imperative that 
Jonas was able to bring to light his “new ecological imperative”, stipulating the 
obligation of man to preserve the existence of humanity in its authenticity. However, this 
new “ecological imperative” was also in complete opposition to that of Kant, since it was 
not founded on the rationality of man nor any longer on universal principles and norms, 
as Kant understood it in his “Categorical Imperative”. It is rather the feeling of fear that 
was at the center of the Jonassian “new ecological imperative”, conceptualized as the 
“heuristic of fear” in his “Responsibility Principle”. In the third section, we approached 
Bloch with his “Principle of Hope” in order to show Jonas’s position in contrast to the 




advancement of technology. We have shown that Jonas sought the opposite to the 
progress of the technology, since, in his view, the progress of the technology is the cause 
of the degradation of “nature” and also the cause of a possible annihilation of the 
existence of life on Earth, especially human life. Hence the purpose of Jonas’s new 
ecological imperative is that man has an obligation to protect nature in order to guarantee 
the existence of the human species on earth as nature is threatened by the progress of 
science and technology. In the fourth section of our work we have tried to scrutinize the 
Jonassian “Responsibility Principle” so that we can understand and discover what its 
importance and impact are in the debates of contemporary environmental ethics. 
 In the second part of this endeavour, we have approached respectively these three 
contemporary philosophers: Ulrich Beck, Bryan Norton and J. Baird Callicott, in order to 
examine the importance and impact of the Jonassian “Responsibility Principle” in the 
debates of contemporary environmental ethics. With Beck, we have highlighted, in the 
first section of this second part of our work, the convergence and divergence between the 
Jonassian “Responsibility Principle” and the “Principle of Precaution” of Beck. As a 
convergence, we have shown that Jonas, like Beck, regards technological progress as a 
risk, a threat to “nature”, which could lead not only to the destruction of “nature” but also 
to the annihilation of human life on Earth. As a point of divergence, we have shown that 
Beck does not seek to find a solution to the technological risk in an ecological imperative 
or in an individual responsibility as Jonas does. Rather, Beck seeks a complete 
eradication of the “latent induced effects”, which are for him the basis of all of risk and 




In the last two sections of the second part of this work, we have examined the 
works of two contemporary environmentalist philosophers, Bryan Norton and J. Baird 
Callicott, in order to highlight the similarities and differences between them and Hans 
Jonas, with his “Responsibility Principle”. Norton and Callicott both draw the foundation 
of their concept of ecology from the work of Aldo Leopold. Moreover, their 
interpretation of the concept of the value of nature has put them in opposition to each 
other. For Norton, “nature” is only an instrument at the service and at the disposal of 
man. We have shown that Norton’s pragmatic approach is quite opposed to Callicott and 
Jonas, since “nature” for these latter two not only has an extrinsic value but also an 
intrinsic value. Callicott, as one of the philosophers most faithful to the work of Aldo 
Leopold and his view on the intrinsic value of “nature”, becomes one of the 
contemporary ecologists that could be more influenced by and allied with the Jonassian 
“Responsibility Principle”. This can be argued even though Callicott has never made any 
direct reference or use any quotation of Jonas and his “Responsibility Principle” in 
Callicott’s interpretation of Aldo Leopold’s “Land Ethic”.  
It is true that Beck, by attacking the progress of technology, also demonstrated a 
more concrete relationship to Jonas’s “Responsibility Principle”; however, the solution 
that Beck brought forward is quite different from the new interpretation of Jonassian 
ethics. The Jonassian view is indeed to see in ethics not only as a relationship between 
human and human, but also as a relationship between human and nature, where “nature” 
will not be considered as only an instrument but also as an end in itself. Hence, we will 
be able to curb the progress of technology that is destroying “nature”, which could cause 




“nature” is by taking responsibility for all of our actions toward “nature”, by recognizing 
its vulnerability and fragility, and by protecting and respecting nature’s rights as we 
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